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SLOWING DOWN ACCELERATED APPROVAL:
EXAMINING THE ROLE OF INDUSTRY
INFLUENCE, PATIENT ADVOCACY
ORGANIZATIONS, AND POLITICAL PRESSURE
ON FDA DRUG APPROVAL
Stephanie Diu*
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has been revered as the
gold standard in pharmaceutical safety and efficacy review since the 1960s.
More recently, partly in response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic and the pressing
need for new treatments, the FDA established an accelerated approval
process to hasten the review of new drug applications so that drugs could be
approved and brought to market as soon as possible. Although accelerated
approval has led to the availability of new treatments for patients with few
other options, this Note argues that, today, the FDA grants accelerated
approval too hastily and may be sacrificing scientific rigor in doing so.
On June 7, 2021, the FDA announced the accelerated approval of
Aduhelm™ (aducanumab), sponsored by pharmaceutical manufacturer
Biogen, for the treatment of Alzheimer’s disease. This approval occurred
despite intense criticism of the drug’s efficacy from the scientific community
and concerns about potentially dangerous side effects. Using Aduhelm as a
case study, this Note illustrates the benefits and risks of the FDA’s
accelerated approval process and proposes areas for improvement. It
suggests revisions to the role of advisory committees that weigh in on
whether a drug should be approved, offers ways to further incentivize
pharmaceutical companies to confirm a new drug’s clinical benefits, and
theorizes how a controversial drug approval from the FDA could be
challenged in court.
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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates food, cosmetics,
human and animal drugs, biological products, medical devices, products
emitting radiation, and tobacco products pursuant to the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).1 The FDA created accelerated approval to allow
faster approval of drugs that fill an unmet medical need in treating serious

1. Ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
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illnesses.2 On June 7, 2021, the FDA announced the accelerated approval of
Aduhelm™ (aducanumab), sponsored by pharmaceutical manufacturer
Biogen, for the treatment of Alzheimer’s disease.3 Aduhelm is a monoclonal
antibody drug—the first therapeutic agent approved to treat Alzheimer’s
disease in nearly two decades.4 Yet, rather than being celebrated as a
breakthrough treatment for a challenging illness, the drug has been mired in
controversy because its approval contradicted the recommendations of the
FDA’s own Peripheral and Central Nervous System Drugs Advisory
Committee.5
Aduhelm’s efficacy—if any—in the treatment of Alzheimer’s remains
unclear.6 A data monitoring committee7 stopped two clinical trials8 early
2. Americans have become increasingly aware of the speedy approval of drugs in light
of the COVID-19 pandemic and the approval of vaccines to combat the underlying
coronavirus disease. See Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (Dec. 23, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-response/
counterterrorism-and-emerging-threats/coronavirus-disease-2019-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/
MZ49-4L74]. It is important to distinguish the approval process for the COVID-19 vaccines
from the process of accelerated approval, which is the subject of this Note. The FDA approved
vaccines for COVID-19 in 2021 under Emergency Use Authorization (EUA). See COVID-19
Vaccines, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Dec. 17, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/emergencypreparedness-and-response/coronavirus-disease-2019-covid-19/covid-19-vaccines
[https://perma.cc/3GAR-FRNW]. EUA may be used during a public health emergency, such
as the COVID-19 pandemic, in which the FDA may allow the use of unapproved medical
products, including vaccines, to treat or prevent serious diseases when there are no adequate,
approved, or available alternatives. See Emergency Use Authorization for Vaccines Explained,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 20, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/vaccines-bloodbiologics/vaccines/emergency-use-authorization-vaccines-explained [https://perma.cc/2LX76YT6]. Thus, while COVID-19 vaccines did receive approval more quickly than they would
have through the traditional FDA approval process, it is important to note that EUA is a
mechanism that is separate from accelerated approval and used under different circumstances.
3. See Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Grants Accelerated Approval for
Alzheimer’s Drug (June 7, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/
fda-grants-accelerated-approval-alzheimers-drug [https://perma.cc/WJ3T-6H78].
4. See Michael Specter, The F.D.A.’s Extraordinary Approval of a Questionable
Treatment for Alzheimer’s, NEW YORKER (June 14, 2021), https://www.newyorker.com/
news/daily-comment/the-fdas-extraordinary-approval-of-a-questionable-treatment-foralzheimers [https://perma.cc/JA9S-76BV].
5. See Nuriel Moghavem et al., Medicare Should Not Cover Aducanumab as a Treatment
for Alzheimer’s Disease, 90 ANNALS OF NEUROLOGY 331, 331 (2021).
6. See Pam Belluck & Rebecca Robbins, F.D.A. Approves Alzheimer’s Drug Despite
Fierce Debate over Whether It Works, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/06/07/health/aduhelm-fda-alzheimers-drug.html
[https://perma.cc/H23G-K9QA]
(noting that “clinical trials of the drug had provided incomplete evidence to demonstrate
effectiveness”).
7. A data monitoring committee is a “group of individuals with pertinent expertise that
reviews on a regular basis accumulating data from one or more ongoing clinical trials.” U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR CLINICAL TRIAL SPONSORS: ESTABLISHMENT AND
OPERATION OF CLINICAL TRIAL DATA MONITORING COMMITTEES 1 (2006),
https://www.fda.gov/media/75398/download [https://perma.cc/U7G8-2FDE].
8. See 221AD301 Phase 3 Study of Aducanumab (BIIB037) in Early Alzheimer’s Disease
(ENGAGE), CLINICALTRIALS.GOV (Sept. 2, 2021) [hereinafter ENGAGE Trial],
https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/study/NCT02477800
[https://perma.cc/XB2A-YY6D];
221AD302 Phase 3 Study of Aducanumab (BIIB037) in Early Alzheimer’s Disease
(EMERGE), CLINICALTRIALS.GOV (Sept. 2, 2021) [hereinafter EMERGE Trial],
https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/study/NCT02484547 [https://perma.cc/D5ZS-N9T3].
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after a futility analysis9 indicated that it was unlikely to show clinical benefit
upon completion.10 Nonetheless, the FDA approved the drug, which is
expected to cost $56,000 a year, raising significant financial concerns for
patients and payers.11 In fact, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
(CMS) announced that premiums for Medicare would increase by an
estimated 15 percent in 2022 and specifically cited the approval of Aduhelm
as one reason for the increase.12 As one journalist noted, “One would have
to go back nearly two decades to find decisions that might have as
far-reaching an impact on the FDA’s regulatory behavior.”13
This Note uses Aduhelm as a case study to assess the benefits and risks of
the FDA’s accelerated approval process and to propose areas for
improvement and revision. Part I provides the legal and scientific framework
for understanding accelerated approval. Part II uses Aduhelm’s approval to
describe the appropriate role of the FDA as a regulatory agency, the influence
of the accelerated approval process in steering the course of future medical
research, and potential economic issues that accelerated approval can spark.
Finally, Part III proposes three strategies for improving the accelerated
approval pathway that could be implemented through the legislature,
regulatory reform, or in the courts.
I. THE LEGAL AND SCIENTIFIC FRAMEWORKS UNDERLYING ACCELERATED
APPROVAL
The FDA operates at the unique intersection of science, law, and public
policy. Thus, to understand how accelerated approval works, one must first
understand the legal and scientific frameworks that allowed the saga of
Aduhelm’s approval to unfold. This part lays the foundation for
understanding accelerated approval from a legal and scientific perspective.
Part I.A discusses the FDA’s historical role in drug approval and where the
need for an accelerated process came from. Part I.B describes how the
9. By performing a futility analysis, a data monitoring committee may recommend,
based on a statistical assessment, that a clinical trial be terminated early because the trial is
unlikely to meet its objectives, and there is therefore no basis for continuing enrollment and/or
follow-up. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 7, at 16.
10. See Belluck & Robbins, supra note 6.
11. See Juliette Cubanski & Tricia Neuman, FDA’s Approval of Biogen’s New
Alzheimer’s Drug Has Huge Cost Implications for Medicare and Beneficiaries, KAISER FAM.
FOUND. (June 10, 2021), https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/fdas-approval-of-biogensnew-alzheimers-drug-has-huge-cost-implications-for-medicare-and-beneficiaries/
[https://perma.cc/F5NL-UYVS].
12. See Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., CMS Announces 2022
Medicare Part B Premiums (Nov. 12, 2021), https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/cms-announces-2022-medicare-part-b-premiums [https://perma.cc/MC9G-9EM8]
(“There is significant uncertainty regarding the potential for future coverage of
clinician-administered Alzheimer’s drugs (i.e., Aduhelm™), requiring additional contingency
reserves.”).
13. Matthew Herper, By Approving Biogen’s Alzheimer’s Drug, the FDA Is Shifting Its
Rules. That Is a Giant Risk, STAT (June 7, 2021), https://www.statnews.com/2021/06/07/byapproving-biogen-alzheimers-drug-fda-is-shifting-its-rules-that-is-a-giant-risk/
[https://perma.cc/BEQ5-FPJK].
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accelerated approval pathway differs from traditional FDA drug application
review. Part I.C addresses legal administrative concerns about how FDA
approval decisions are made. Finally, Part I.D examines Aduhelm’s approval
and the reasons for its controversy.
A. The FDA’s Historic Role in Drug Approval
The FDA’s regulatory authority was originally based on the 1906 Pure
Food and Drugs Act,14 enacted to better regulate widespread use of
over-the-counter medications that included ingredients such as opium,
alcohol, and cocaine.15 The statute tasked the Bureau of Chemistry (later
renamed the Food and Drug Administration) with preventing the
“manufacture, sale, or transportation of adulterated or misbranded or
poisonous or deleterious food, drugs, medicines, and liquors,”16 but did not
address how to ensure the safety or efficacy of regulated products.17 As a
result, many drugs continued to be sold without any preapproval clinical
testing.18
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act was passed in 1938, largely in
response to public outcry from the sulfanilamide debacle, when more than
100 people across the United States died after ingesting sulfanilamide to treat
streptococcal infections.19 The 1938 law contained a comprehensive
regulatory scheme for marketing new drugs in the United States20 and
required companies to prove to the FDA that a drug was safe before it could
be sold.21 The statute remains the basis for FDA regulation today.22
14. Ch. 3915, § 6, 34 Stat. 768, 769 (1906) (repealed 1938).
15. See Jonathan J. Darrow et al., FDA Approval and Regulation of Pharmaceuticals,
1983–2018, 323 JAMA 164, 165 (2020).
16. § 6, 34 Stat. at 768.
17. See Darrow et al., supra note 15, at 165.
18. See, e.g., Part II: 1938, Food, Drug, Cosmetic Act, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
(Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/changes-science-law-and-regulatoryauthorities/part-ii-1938-food-drug-cosmetic-act [https://perma.cc/T75Y-UJXN] (explaining
that the lackluster 1906 law allowed dangerous products to remain on the market, including
an eyelash dye that caused injuries including permanent blindness and a radium-containing
tonic that killed consumers).
19. See Carol Ballentine, Taste of Raspberries, Taste of Death: The 1937 Elixir
Sulfanilamide Incident, FDA CONSUMER MAG. (June 1981), https://www.fda.gov/
files/about%20fda/published/The-Sulfanilamide-Disaster.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9XXELKS3]. Sulfanilamide had been used safely in tablet and powder form, but a pharmaceutical
company created a liquid form of the drug by dissolving sulfanilamide in diethylene glycol.
See id. The company did not test the new formulation for toxicity; there were no laws at the
time requiring safety studies for new drugs. See id. After the American Medical Association
received reports of deaths related to the new sulfanilamide formulation, it analyzed the mixture
and discovered that diethylene glycol, a chemical normally used as an antifreeze, was a toxic
ingredient. See id.
20. See 21 U.S.C. § 355.
21. See id. § 355(e) (allowing the FDA to withdraw approval of a drug if “clinical or other
experience, tests, or other scientific data show that such drug is unsafe for use”).
22. See Part III: Drugs and Foods Under the 1938 Act and Its Amendments, U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/changes-science-law-andregulatory-authorities/part-iii-drugs-and-foods-under-1938-act-and-its-amendments
[https://perma.cc/G9K9-FM6W].
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The FDA’s global reputation for excellence in protecting public health was
established in 1960, when Dr. Frances Oldham Kelsey, an FDA medical
officer, refused to approve the drug thalidomide for sale in the United
States.23 Thalidomide was marketed to pregnant women for treating
nausea.24 Dr. Kelsey resisted corporate pressure from thalidomide’s maker
and raised concerns about the drug’s effect on human embryos. 25 Based on
Dr. Kelsey’s analysis of the data, the FDA rejected the application for
thalidomide approval, effectively saving the United States from a generation
of severe congenital deformities and infant death, while cementing the
FDA’s reputation as the gold standard for pharmaceutical safety review.26
After the FDA steered the United States away from the potential
thalidomide disaster, Congress strengthened laws governing pharmaceutical
safety and efficacy.27 In 1962, Congress passed the Kefauver-Harris Drug
Amendments28 to the FDCA, requiring that drug manufacturers provide
“substantial evidence” that drugs were effective through “adequate and
well-controlled investigations . . . on the basis of which it could fairly and
responsibly be concluded . . . that the drug will have the effect it purports or
is represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended,
or suggested in the labeling or proposed labeling thereof.”29 The FDA’s
interpretation of what qualifies as substantial evidence has been “at least two
adequate and well-controlled studies, each convincing on its own,” because
typically, a single clinical experimental finding of efficacy, unsupported by
other independent evidence, is not adequate scientific support for a
conclusion of effectiveness.30 In practice, adequate and well-controlled
23. See Melissa Marie Bean, Fatal Flaws in the Food and Drug Administration’s Drug
Approval Formula, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 881, 883.
24. See Leila McNeill, The Woman Who Stood Between America and a Generation of
‘Thalidomide Babies,’ SMITHSONIAN MAG. (May 8, 2017), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/
science-nature/woman-who-stood-between-america-and-epidemic-birth-defects-180963165/
[https://perma.cc/Y5UM-SAWJ].
25. See Bean, supra note 23, at 883.
26. See McNeill, supra note 24. In Europe, Australia, and some South American
countries, thalidomide was marketed extensively, resulting in birth defects in more than
10,000 infants and an unknown number of miscarriages. See Eric Fischer, After 60 Years,
Scientists Uncover How Thalidomide Produced Birth Defects, DANA-FARBER CANCER INST.
(Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.dana-farber.org/newsroom/news-releases/2018/after-60-years-scientists-uncover-how-thalidomide-produced-birth-defects/
[https://perma.cc/5JAVZRMD].
27. See Part III: Drugs and Foods Under the 1938 Act and Its Amendments, supra note
22.
28. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
29. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d).
30. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: PROVIDING CLINICAL
EVIDENCE OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR HUMAN DRUG AND BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS 3 (1998),
https://www.fda.gov/media/71655/download [https://perma.cc/TLQ4-S23C].
Multiple
independent trials offset the possibility that any single clinical trial may be subject to biases
or only produced positive results by chance. See id. The FDA has also acknowledged in draft
guidance that under certain circumstances, one adequate and well-controlled trial plus
confirmatory evidence may be enough (e.g., if one trial involved many test subjects from
multiple testing centers and demonstrated a very statistically persuasive effect on the primary
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clinical investigations are blinded, randomized, placebo-controlled, and
generate data that enable a direct assessment of clinical benefits.31
The law requires a sponsor32 (generally, the pharmaceutical company) to
submit an Investigational New Drug Application (IND) that summarizes
preclinical trial data and other information about the drug’s effects in
animals.33 The IND also requires the sponsor to establish protocols for
human trials divided into three phases.34 Importantly, the final phase
involves randomized clinical trials that measure clinical endpoints to produce
evidence that the drug in question has a positive balance of benefit and risk.35
Clinical endpoints measure clinically meaningful outcomes related to the
disease process—that is, “how a person feels, functions, or survives.”36
Evidence gathered during clinical trials becomes part of the New Drug
Application (NDA) submitted to the FDA, which reviews the data acquired
from clinical trials to determine whether the sponsor has shown adequate
support for its safety and efficacy claims and can proceed to marketing the
drug.37 The FDA and the sponsor may meet throughout this process to

outcome). See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEMONSTRATING SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF
EFFECTIVENESS FOR HUMAN DRUG AND BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 9
(2019), https://www.fda.gov/media/133660/download [https://perma.cc/Q4F9-7FF6].
31. See EVA TEMKIN & JONATHAN TRINH, NAT’L ORG. FOR RARE DISORDERS, FDA’S
ACCELERATED APPROVAL PATHWAY:
A RARE DISEASE PERSPECTIVE 5 (2021),
https://rarediseases.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/NRD-2182-Policy-Report_AcceleratedApproval_FNL.pdf [https://perma.cc/GLU6-UG8U]; see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(a) (2022)
(“The purpose of conducting clinical investigations of a drug is to distinguish the effect of a
drug from other influences, such as spontaneous change in the course of the disease, placebo
effect, or biased observation.”).
32. A sponsor is “a person who takes responsibility for and initiates a clinical
investigation. The sponsor may be an individual or pharmaceutical company, governmental
agency, academic institution, private organization, or other organization.” Definitions and
Interpretations, 21 C.F.R. § 312.3 (2022).
33. See IND Content and Format, 21 C.F.R. § 312.23 (2022); see also Darrow et al., supra
note 15, at 166.
34. See Phases of an Investigation, 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2022); see also Darrow et al.,
supra note 15, at 166–67. Phase I studies are uncontrolled studies in humans and are generally
intended to gather information about pharmacokinetics (time course of drug absorption,
distribution, metabolism, and excretion) and pharmacodynamics (relationship between drug
concentration and the resulting effect). See id. at 166. Phase II trials evaluate adverse effects
and efficacy in up to a few hundred participants with the condition being studied. See id. at
166–67. Phase III trials can include several hundred to several thousand patients and are
intended to collect evidence of the benefit-risk relationship of the drug to obtain FDA
approval. See id.
35. See Surrogate Endpoint Resources for Drug and Biologic Development, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN. (July 24, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/development-resources/surrogateendpoint-resources-drug-and-biologic-development [https://perma.cc/5CZE-YA4S].
36. Charlie McLeod et al., Choosing Primary Endpoints for Clinical Trials of Health Care
Interventions, CONTEMP. CLINICAL TRIALS COMMC’NS, Dec. 2019, at 1, 2. For example, the
six-minute walk test is widely used as a clinical endpoint for measuring functional exercise
capacity in patients with cardiac and pulmonary diseases. See Lisa Lancaster et al.,
Standardization of the 6-Min Walk Test in Clinical Trials of Idiopathic Pulmonary Fibrosis,
CONTEMP. CLINICAL TRIALS, Jan. 2021, at 1, 1.
37. See Darrow et al., supra note 15, at 167.
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discuss various issues, such as the safety of proceeding to the next phase or
the best way to analyze data.38
The traditional drug development process takes an average of twelve years
from concept creation to market authorization.39 One reason why drug
development is so prolonged is that it can take an extended period of time to
measure a drug’s intended clinical benefit.40 Concerns about this lengthy
process led to the development of an accelerated pathway to expedite
approval of treatments for the most serious diseases.41
B. The Modern Accelerated Approval Process
In the 1980s, the Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) epidemic dramatically increased pressure
on the FDA to streamline the drug approval process as protesters from
affected communities demanded less stringent efficacy requirements for new
drugs intended to treat incurable and fatal diseases.42 Dr. Gregg Gonsalves,
an epidemiologist at Yale School of Public Health, recalled: “You had AIDS
activists screaming that the FDA is killing us . . . . We were pushing for
accelerated approval saying, look, we don’t have time to wait for clinical
access.”43 In response, the FDA established several reforms to the drug
approval process,44 including the accelerated approval pathway in 1992.45
This section explains the structure of accelerated approval, beginning with
the criteria that make a drug eligible for accelerated approval. Next, it
reviews the critical role of advisory committees in the FDA’s decision on
whether to grant approval. Finally, this section considers the importance of

38. See Erin E. Kepplinger, FDA’s Expedited Approval Mechanisms for New Drug
Products, 34 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 15, 21 (2015).
39. See Gail A. Van Norman, Drugs, Devices, and the FDA: Part 1: An Overview of
Approval Processes for Drugs, 1 JACC: BASIC TO TRANSLATIONAL SCI. 170, 170 (2016).
40. See Accelerated Approval, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 4, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/patients/fast-track-breakthrough-therapy-accelerated-approval-priorityreview/accelerated-approval [https://perma.cc/RNU9-M372].
41. See infra Part I.B.
42. See Lewis A. Grossman, AIDS Activists, FDA Regulation, and the Amendment of
America’s Drug Constitution, 42 AM. J.L. & MED. 687, 688–690 (2016). By the early 1980s,
FDA review times had increased to more than thirty months and activists were fed up. See
Darrow et al., supra note 15, at 165.
43. Joanne Silberner, Accelerated Approval, the Path Used to Greenlight Biogen
Alzheimer’s Drug, Has a Checkered Track Record, Critics Say, STAT (July 21, 2021),
https://www.statnews.com/2021/07/21/biogen-alzheimers-accelerated-approvalconfirmatory-trials/ [https://perma.cc/24DU-DN26].
44. Besides accelerated approval, the FDA established three other mechanisms to hasten
the availability of drugs for serious diseases: fast-track designation, breakthrough therapy,
and priority review. See Fast Track, Breakthrough Therapy, Accelerated Approval, Priority
Review, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/patients/learnabout-drug-and-device-approvals/fast-track-breakthrough-therapy-accelerated-approvalpriority-review [https://perma.cc/72CJ-D98E]. Although the names of these programs all
imply speed, they are distinct approval pathways with different criteria and are not the focus
of this Note.
45. See Kepplinger, supra note 38, at 24–25.
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Phase IV post-marketing trials in confirming clinical benefits after a drug is
granted accelerated approval.
1. What Is Accelerated Approval?
According to the FDA, accelerated approval hastens the review of NDA
documentation so that approval can be made as soon as possible after data
are gathered.46 Under FDA regulations, the FDA may grant marketing
approval for a new drug based on “adequate and well-controlled clinical trials
establishing that the drug product has an effect on a surrogate endpoint that
is reasonably likely, based on epidemiologic, therapeutic, pathophysiologic,
or other evidence, to predict clinical benefit.”47
Surrogate endpoints are key to the concept of accelerating approval of
drugs in this pathway. A surrogate endpoint is an outcome (e.g., a laboratory
measurement, radiographic image, or related physical sign) that is expected
to predict patient survival or symptom improvement but that is not itself a
direct measure of clinical benefit.48 By using a surrogate endpoint instead of
a clinical endpoint,49 researchers can focus on events that occur earlier in
time instead of waiting to see actual clinical benefits, resulting in shorter
clinical trials.50 For example, one clinical endpoint for researching a cancer
drug would be mortality and would require waiting to see whether the drug
extends the survival rate for cancer patients.51 But under accelerated
approval, the FDA may grant approval of the drug based on tumor
shrinkage—a surrogate endpoint that is reasonably likely to predict the
clinical benefit of delayed mortality.52 Surrogate endpoints and the
accelerated approval pathway have become important tools for the
development of treatments for rare diseases, which can be challenging due to
“small heterogeneous patient populations, long time-frames for disease
progression, [and] a poor understanding of disease natural history.”53

46. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.500 (2022); see also Accelerated Approval, supra note 40.
21 C.F.R. § 314, subpart H governs accelerated approval of new drugs. See 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.500 (2022) (noting that accelerated approval applies to “certain new drug products that
have been studied for their safety and effectiveness in treating serious or life-threatening
illnesses and that provide meaningful therapeutic benefit to patients over existing treatments
(e.g., ability to treat patients unresponsive to, or intolerant of, available therapy, or improved
patient response over available therapy)”).
47. 21 C.F.R. § 314.510 (2022) (emphasis added).
48. See Alexandra Tsakopoulos et al., Note, The Right to Try: An Overview of Efforts to
Obtain Expedited Access to Unapproved Treatment for the Terminally Ill, 70 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 617, 625 (2015); Kepplinger, supra note 38, at 29. For example, a laboratory
measurement of bacteria in the blood may serve as a surrogate endpoint for clinical resolution
of infection. See id., at 29–30.
49. For an explanation of clinical endpoints, see supra Part I.A.
50. See Kepplinger, supra note 38, at 30.
51. See Tsakopoulos et al., supra note 48, at 625.
52. See id.
53. Emil D. Kakkis et al., Recommendations for the Development of Rare Disease Drugs
Using the Accelerated Approval Pathway and for Qualifying Biomarkers as Primary
Endpoints, ORPHANET J. OF RARE DISEASES, Feb. 2015, at 1, 1.
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Although the accelerated approval process originally allowed for approval
based on surrogate endpoints to speed up the availability of HIV/AIDS and
cancer treatments, the pathway has recently been expanded to include
treatments for other serious and rare diseases for which there are inadequate
therapies.54 In 2012, Congress passed the Food and Drug Administration
Safety and Innovation Act55 (FDASIA), which amended the FDCA and
encouraged the FDA to “utilize innovative and flexible approaches to the
assessment of products under accelerated approval for treatments for patients
with serious or life-threatening diseases or conditions and unmet medical
needs.”56 Congress found that “following the establishment of the
accelerated approval mechanism . . . the FDA should be encouraged to
implement more broadly effective processes for the expedited development
and review of innovative new medicines intended to address unmet medical
needs for serious or life-threatening diseases or conditions.”57 Thus, the
FDASIA reflected Congress’s intent that the FDA make greater use of
accelerated approval and apply it to other diseases.58
President Barack Obama’s Council of Advisors on Science and
Technology released a report in 2012 encouraging the FDA to expand the
scope of acceptable endpoints used to approve drugs for serious diseases with
insufficient treatment options.59 The report suggested that accelerated
approval could be appropriate for diseases such as Alzheimer’s disease,
muscular dystrophy, and spinal muscular atrophy.60 As of December 31,
2021, 278 drugs have entered the market via the accelerated approval
pathway.61 These drugs target a range of diseases including Alzheimer’s
disease, Duchenne muscular dystrophy, sickle cell disease, and various types
of cancer.62 Overall, the median time from an IND to FDA approval has
been calculated to be 0.9 years shorter for drugs with an expedited program
than for drugs without an expedited program.63

54. See Frank J. Sasinowski & Alexander J. Varond, FDA’s Flexibility in Subpart H
Approvals: Assessing Quantum of Effectiveness Evidence, 71 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 135, 136
(2016).
55. Pub. L. No. 112-144, 126 Stat. 993 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of the U.S.C.).
56. FDASIA § 901(b), 126 Stat. at 1085.
57. FDASIA § 901(a)(1)(B)–(C), 126 Stat. at 1082.
58. See Kyle T. Edwards, The Role of Patient Participation in Drug Approvals: Lessons
from the Accelerated Approval of Eteplirsen, 72 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 406, 421 (2017).
59. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
ON PROPELLING INNOVATION IN DRUG DISCOVERY, DEVELOPMENT, AND EVALUATION 59
(2012), https://www.broadinstitute.org/files/sections/about/PCAST/2012%20pcast-fda.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B27R-VP9Z].
60. See id. at 59–60.
61. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CDER DRUG AND BIOLOGIC ACCELERATED
APPROVALS BASED ON A SURROGATE ENDPOINT AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2021 (2021),
https://www.fda.gov/media/151146/download [https://perma.cc/Q73Q-F4XJ].
62. See id.
63. See Thomas J. Hwang et al., The FDA’s Expedited Programs and Clinical
Development Times for Novel Therapeutics, 2012–2016, 318 JAMA 2137, 2138 (2017)
(analyzing FDA-approved drugs between 2012 and 2016).
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2. Advisory Committees: A Critical Part of Accelerated Approval
Advisory committees are established to advise the FDA on the “safety and
effectiveness, including the labeling and advertising . . . and on the scientific
standards appropriate for a determination of safety and effectiveness in that
class of drugs.”64 Generally, an advisory committee is a group of individuals
“possessing recognized expertise and judgment in a specific field . . . [who]
have the training and experience necessary to evaluate information
objectively and to interpret its significance.”65 Anyone can nominate an
individual or themselves for committee membership, and qualified
candidates are appointed as members for terms of one to four years.66 Per
the Federal Advisory Committee Act,67 membership in advisory committees
must be “fairly balanced in terms of the points of view represented and the
functions to be performed.”68 Advisory committee members are often
physician-scientists whose specialties or research areas involve the type of
product being reviewed, but they can also be statisticians, industry
representatives, or consumer representatives from patient advocacy
organizations (PAO).69
Advisory committee meetings may occur at any stage of the drug approval
review process—typically, meetings are held to assist the FDA with
interpretation when questions related to trial data arise.70 The advisory
committee reviews and debates evidence presented by the FDA and product
sponsors during a public hearing, hears comments from members of the
public, and usually holds formal votes before writing recommendations for
the FDA’s consideration.71 Advisory committees provide valuable scientific
expertise, which “serve[s] to legitimize and lend credibility to the decisions
of the agency as scientifically founded.”72 Notably, the FDA is not bound to
64. 21 C.F.R. § 14.160(a) (2022); see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY ADVISORY COMMITTEES: IMPLEMENTING SECTION 120 OF THE FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION MODERNIZATION ACT OF 1997, at 1 (1998), https://www.fda.gov/media/
72297/download [https://perma.cc/YXU5-NFJ6] (“Advisory committees provide independent
advice and recommendations to the [FDA] on scientific and technical matters related to the
development and evaluation of products regulated by the Agency.”).
65. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 64, at 2.
66. See Learn About FDA Advisory Committees, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
(Oct. 19, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/patients/about-office-patient-affairs/learn-about-fdaadvisory-committees [https://perma.cc/35HT-ZTQK].
67. 5 U.S.C. app.
68. Id. § 5(b)(2).
69. See Advisory Committees: Critical to the FDA’s Product Review Process, U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN. (May 4, 2016), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/information-consumers-andpatients-drugs/advisory-committees-critical-fdas-product-review-process
[https://perma.cc/N2QE-E4W2].
70. See Learn About FDA Advisory Committees, supra note 66.
71. See Audrey D. Zhang et al., Association Between Food and Drug Administration
Advisory Committee Recommendations and Agency Actions, 2008–2015, 97 MILBANK Q. 796,
797 (2019); Mara Sanders, Note, Sex, Drugs, and Advisory Committees: An Analysis of
Pharmaceutical Industry Manipulation of FDA Vulnerability to Sociopolitical Influences on
Matters of Women’s Health, 48 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 149, 161 (2017).
72. Sanders, supra note 71, at 161.
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the advisory committee’s recommendations but follows them most of the
time.73 One study of advisory committee meetings between 2008 and 2015
found that only 22 percent of the actions taken by the FDA contradicted the
recommendations set forth by the advisory committees.74
3. Phase IV Post-Marketing Trials: Well-Intentioned but Poorly Executed
Accelerated approval permits approval of a drug earlier in the drug
development process but ultimately holds the drug to the same safety and
efficacy standards that the standard approval process would. After a drug is
granted accelerated approval based on studies using surrogate endpoints, the
pharmaceutical company is required to continue performing studies to
ultimately prove a clinical benefit—these post-approval clinical studies are
known as Phase IV post-marketing trials.75 The FDA evaluates evidence
from Phase IV post-marketing trials “to ensure that any remaining doubts
about the relationship of the effect on the surrogate to clinical benefit are
resolved.”76 The FDA notes that the sponsor should also submit “evidence
that a proposed surrogate endpoint . . . is reasonably likely to predict the
intended clinical benefit of a drug.”77 These trials must be completed with
due diligence, which the FDA has interpreted to mean that the protocol for
the trial should be developed as early as possible, and timelines for
enrollment and trial completion should be specified.78 Generally, the Phase
IV trial would evaluate a clinical endpoint that directly measures the clinical
benefit that the surrogate endpoint was supposed to predict.79
If the post-marketing trials validate the surrogate endpoints and verify
clinical benefit, accelerated approvals are generally converted to traditional
approvals.80 However, if the Phase IV trials fail to show a benefit, the FDA
may remove the drug from the market or impose additional labeling
requirements.81 If the FDA determines there are grounds for withdrawal, it
may ask the sponsor to request withdrawal of approval or notify the sponsor
of an opportunity for a hearing.82 In most cases, the sponsor voluntarily
withdraws the drug in question from the market before the FDA acts.83
73.
74.
75.
76.

See Zhang et al., supra note 71, at 796–97.
See id. at 807.
See Kepplinger, supra note 38, at 36.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: EXPEDITED PROGRAMS FOR
SERIOUS CONDITIONS—DRUGS AND BIOLOGICS 19 (2014), https://www.fda.gov/media/86377/
download [https://perma.cc/L7S2-PFHZ].
77. See id.
78. See id. at 22.
79. See id. at 23.
80. See Temkin & Trinh, supra note 31, at 14.
81. See id. at 16.
82. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.530(a)–(c), 601.43(c)(1) (2022).
83. See Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Pharmaceutical Policy in the United States in 2019:
An Overview of the Landscape and Avenues for Improvement, 30 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 421,
452 (2019); see also Recall Policy, 21 C.F.R. § 7.40(c) (2022) (noting that rather than the
FDA itself taking a drug off the market, the sponsor’s voluntary “[r]ecall is generally more
appropriate and affords better protection for consumers than seizure, when many lots of
product have been widely distributed”).
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Unless withdrawal procedures are initiated, drugs may continue to be
marketed as accelerated approval drugs.84 In practice, pharmaceutical
companies do not consider withdrawal to be a credible threat unless there is
a serious safety concern.85 The FDA may also seek civil monetary penalties
from sponsors who do not comply with Phase IV post-marketing trial
requirements.86 However, the FDA has been slow to take remedial action—
fines are rarely invoked due to administrative complexity.87
Contrary to the expected process, many sponsors fail to comply with full
completion of the required Phase IV post-marketing trials88 or only conduct
small, inconclusive trials.89 This failure is partly attributable to the fact that
after approval, it becomes increasingly difficult to recruit patient participants,
who question why they should risk being placed in a placebo group when the
drug is already available on the market.90 This is an especially pertinent
concern for drugs that are granted accelerated approval because of the ethical
questions raised for serious illnesses.91 One analysis of accelerated approval
drugs brought onto the market in 2009 and 2010 found that, by 2015, only
54 percent of required post-marketing studies had been completed and that
20 percent had not even been started.92 Failure to execute required
post-marketing studies means that some drugs with no proven clinical benefit

84. See Temkin & Trinh, supra note 31, at 14; Julia A. Beaver & Richard Pazdur,
“Dangling” Accelerated Approvals in Oncology, 384 NEW ENG. J. MED. e68(1), e68(1)
(2021).
85. See Charles Steenburg, The Food and Drug Administration’s Use of Postmarketing
(Phase IV) Study Requirements: Exception to the Rule?, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 295, 337–38
(2006).
86. See Kesselheim et al., supra note 83, at 448.
87. See id.
88. See, e.g., Michael S. Sinha & Stephen Latham, Patient Advocacy Organizations and
FDA Drug Approval:
Lessons from Aduhelm, STAT (July 23, 2021),
https://www.statnews.com/2021/07/23/patient-advocacy-organizations-lessons-fromaducanumab/ [https://perma.cc/737T-QRLS] (noting that Exondys 51, a $300,000-a-year
treatment, remains on the market even after missing its post-marketing trial deadline in May
2021).
89. See Silberner, supra note 43.
90. See Stephanie Cajigal, What FDA’s Controversial Accelerated Approval of
Aducanumab Means for Other Neurology Drugs, NEUROLOGYTODAY (Aug. 5, 2021),
https://journals.lww.com/neurotodayonline/fulltext/2021/08050/what_fda_s_controversial_a
ccelerated_approval_of.1.aspx [https://perma.cc/XP5S-9W5F]; see also Robert A. Bohrer,
Drug Prices, Dying Patients, and the Pharmaceutical Marketplace: A New Conditional
Approval Pathway for Critical Unmet Medical Needs, 12 DREXEL L. REV. 1, 18 (2019) (“[F]or
those drugs that go through the accelerated approval . . . there is a lower standard of evidence
for approval and, as a result, even less certainty provided to doctors and patients that the
benefits of the drugs do in fact exceed their risks.” (footnotes omitted)).
91. See Steenburg, supra note 85, at 372 (“Because Phase IV studies by definition involve
products that FDA has concluded to be safe and effective (albeit subject to confirmation of
some sort), any trial involving a conventional placebo arm raises serious ethical questions.”).
92. See Steven Woloshin et al., The Fate of FDA Postapproval Studies, 377 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1114, 1114 (2017). Reasons for incomplete or unfulfilled studies included difficulty
recruiting patients, or the FDA freeing the sponsor from obligation to conduct the study
because it was no longer feasible or would no longer provide useful information. See id. at
1115–16.
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may stay on the market and may be used by patients who rely on the FDA to
assess the safety and efficacy of their treatments.93
C. Legal Administrative Concerns of FDA Decisions
The FDA is supposed to work closely with the pharmaceutical companies
it regulates and it inevitably faces industry pressure to approve drugs, but
ultimately, the agency must base its decisions on objective evidence to
maintain scientific integrity. Once the FDA makes a decision, it is difficult
to overturn it. This section first describes regulatory capture and regulatory
reactivity, two phenomena which make it difficult for the FDA to remain
unbiased. This section then describes tools of administrative law for
challenging federal agency decision-making.
1. Regulatory Capture and Regulatory Reactivity: When Agencies and
Industry Get Too Cozy
Regulatory capture refers to the phenomenon where “regulated interests
exert such an influence over their regulators that they essentially control the
agencies, at the expense of the intended beneficiaries of the regulatory
system.”94 Regulatory capture is sometimes used as an accusation that an
agency failed to serve the public interest as Congress intended.95 For
example, Dr. Michael Carome, Director of the Health Research Group at
Public Citizen, a consumer advocacy nonprofit, has criticized the approval of
Aduhelm as a result of regulatory capture.96 One explanation for regulatory
capture is the “revolving door” practice of industry executives taking senior
appointments at the FDA, thereby increasing the likelihood that the FDA will
take positions that favor the regulated industry.97
When making the decision to approve new drugs, the FDA must consider
the trade-off between speeding up availability of drugs for which there is an
93. See Bishal Gyawali et al., Regulatory and Clinical Consequences of Negative
Confirmatory Trials of Accelerated Approval Cancer Drugs: Retrospective Observational
Study, BRIT. MED. J., Sept. 2021, at 1, 7.
94. Diana R.H. Winters, Intractable Delay and the Need to Amend the Petition Provisions
of the FDCA, 90 IND. L.J. 1047, 1081 (2015).
95. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Blowout: Legal Legacy of the Deepwater Horizon
Catastrophe: The Complexity of Regulatory Capture: Diagnosis, Causality, and
Remediation, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 221, 223 (2012).
96. See Jeffrey Toobin, The Road to Aduhelm: What One Ex-FDA Adviser Called
‘Probably the Worst Drug Approval Decision in Recent US History’ for an Alzheimer’s
Treatment, CNN (Sept. 27, 2021, 10:01 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/09/26/
politics/alzheimers-drug-aduhelm-fda-approval/index.html [https://perma.cc/L6D3-CAWB]
(detailing that, according to Dr. Carome, members of the FDA “were not objective, unbiased
regulators” and instead “became a partner with Biogen”).
97. See Allison Parr, Note, Agribusiness and Antibiotics: A Market-Based Solution, 73
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 338, 350 (2018); see also Sydney Lupkin, A Look at How the Revolving
Door Spins from FDA to Industry, NPR (Sept. 28, 2016, 10:48 AM), https://www.npr.org/
sections/health-shots/2016/09/28/495694559/a-look-at-how-the-revolving-door-spins-fromfda-to-industry [https://perma.cc/D5TS-KFQY] (describing one study which found that about
27 percent of FDA reviewers in the hematology-oncology field left the agency from 2001 to
2010 to work for pharmaceutical companies).
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urgent need and ensuring the safety and efficacy of the drug in question.98
But when the FDA is driven by a particular short-term goal (e.g., the approval
of a certain drug), it may use the “flexibility afforded by an expedited
pathway to issue an authorization or approval when, in light of available data
and guiding principles, such authorization or approval should not be
issued.”99 Professor Yaniv Heled and other scholars coined the term
“regulatory reactivity” to describe this phenomenon.100 It is “a mode of
agency decision-making that occurs: 1) when an agency does not adhere to
predetermined principles, standards, and/or operative procedures in reaching
its decision; 2) in direct reaction to pressure . . .; 3) resulting in the
furtherance of short-term agendas rather than public health goals.”101
Decisions characterized by regulatory reactivity fail to capture the true costs
and risks of a given marketing approval.102 Existing review frameworks,
such as Chevron and Auer deference,103 allow for agency discretion but do
not give courts tools to spot when regulatory reactivity decisions have been
made because the agency can provide seemingly credible justifications for
the adoption of a given measure.104
2. The Chevron Doctrine
Congress delegates much regulatory authority to administrative agencies
by enacting broad statutes with the expectation that the agencies will fill in
the gaps via rulemaking, adjudication, and informal guidance.105 When an
agency wants its policy to have the effect of law, it must promulgate a rule.106
In notice-and-comment rulemaking, the agency informs the public about a
proposed rule, at which point members of the public may provide opinions
and suggestions for the agency’s consideration.107 Before the agency enacts
the final, legally enforceable rule, the federal Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) must review the rule to determine whether the agency
engaged in a proper cost-benefit analysis.108 Because incorporating public
feedback and waiting for OMB review can be time-consuming, the FDA has

98. See Yaniv Heled et al., Regulatory Reactivity: FDA and the Response to COVID-19,
76 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 318, 319–20 (2021).
99. Id. at 321.
100. See id.
101. Id. See infra Part I.D for a discussion on Aduhelm’s approval, arguably an example
of regulatory reactivity.
102. See Heled et al., supra note 98, at 322.
103. See infra Part I.C.2.
104. See Heled et al., supra note 98, at 322.
105. See K.M. Lewis, Informal Guidance and the FDA, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 507, 507
(2011).
106. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(4).
107. See Lauren Kostman, Note, The “Natural” Response for Adjudicating Current
Litigation When the Creation of a Related Agency Rule Is Simultaneously Underway,
41 CARDOZO L. REV. 353, 363 (2019).
108. See Nicholas R. Parrillo, Should the Public Get to Participate Before Federal
Agencies Issue Guidance?: An Empirical Study, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 57, 79 (2019).
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been criticized for being too slow.109 As a result, the FDA largely relies on
issuing informal guidance and treats guidance documents as if they were
binding rules, despite not being required to subject the guidance to the more
stringent notice-and-comment procedure.110
The Administrative Procedure Act111 (APA) grants federal courts
jurisdiction to review administrative decisions.112 The Chevron test, first set
forth in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,113
calls for a two-step analysis to evaluate an agency’s interpretation of
ambiguous statutory language.114 First, courts must determine whether
Congress has spoken directly on the question at issue.115 “If the intent of
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; the court, as well as the
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress.”116 If Congress has not expressed a view on the question at issue,
then courts must determine “whether the agency’s answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.”117
Since the establishment of the Chevron doctrine, courts have expanded the
level of deference given to agencies to include the agency’s interpretation of
its own ambiguous regulations.118 In Auer v. Robbins,119 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation is “controlling

109. See Kostman, supra note 107, at 363–64; see also Parrillo, supra note 108, at 80
(interviewing agency officials who believed that issuing guidance instead of
notice-and-comment rulemaking was faster because it avoided OMB review). One study
analyzing rules on medical products between 2000 and 2012 found that the FDA took a median
time of 7.3 years to issue a final rule. See Thomas J. Hwang et al., Quantifying the Food and
Drug Administration’s Rulemaking Delays Highlights the Need for Transparency, 33 HEALTH
AFFS. 309, 311 (2014).
110. Chad Landmon et al., Open the Floodgates: The Potential Impact on Litigation
Against FDA If the Supreme Court Reverses or Curtails Chevron Deference, 74 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 358, 359 (2019); see also Chase Weidner, The Guidance Document Dilemma: Reforming
the FDA’s Use of Guidance Documents for the 21st Century, 75 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
137, 143 (2020) (noting that because the FDA holds great leverage over regulated entities,
“the reality in practice is that the guidance documents often do function like legislative rules
even though they are neither the result of adjudication nor the byproduct of formal or informal
rulemaking”).
111. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706.
112. See id. § 706 (“[T]he reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law,
interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability
of the terms of an agency action.”).
113. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
114. Id. at 842–43. In this landmark case, the Supreme Court held that the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) could treat all pollution-emitting devices within the same industrial
grouping as though they were encased within a single “bubble” because the EPA based its
treatment on a permissible interpretation of the term, “stationary source,” in an environmental
statute. Id. at 845. In doing so, the Supreme Court established the test, known as the Chevron
doctrine, for deciding whether a court should defer to a government agency’s interpretation of
a statute. See id. at 842.
115. See id. at 842–43.
116. See id.
117. Id. at 843.
118. See Landmon et al., supra note 110, at 361.
119. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
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unless ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’”120 The
Chevron doctrine has continued to evolve in response to growing concerns
about regulatory capture.121
The Supreme Court articulated what is now known as hard look review in
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance.122 Hard look review requires an agency to show that at the time
it took the action in question, the agency had a contemporaneous rationale
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of “reasoned decisionmaking.” 123
Nowadays, hard look review is the most common reason why courts vacate
federal agencies’ actions.124 Further, in Encino Motorcars, LLC v.
Navarro,125 the Court highlighted the connection between the Chevron
doctrine and agency procedure, holding that an agency can lose the
opportunity for Chevron deference if it uses defective procedures in its
decision-making.126 Importantly, failure to explain an inconsistency is a
“reason for holding an interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious change
from agency practice,” and arbitrary action “is itself unlawful and receives
no Chevron deference.”127
Courts are usually deferential to agency discretion and rely heavily on the
FDA’s expertise, especially regarding technical or scientific decisions.128 In
fact, suing the FDA under the Chevron test has been described as a “David
versus Goliath-like battle [e]xcept here, David almost never wins.”129
Perhaps that is appropriate, as proponents of the Chevron doctrine argue that
agencies have more expertise to say what the law is when it comes to

120. Id. at 461 (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359
(1989)).
121. See John Blevins, License to Uber: Using Administrative Law to Fix Occupational
Licensing, 64 UCLA L. REV. 844, 885 (2017) (noting that arbitrary and capricious review
grew in response to concerns from courts and the legal academy about agency capture).
122. 463 U.S. 29 (1983). In this case, the Supreme Court concluded that the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s decision to rescind its requirement that passive
restraints be installed in new cars was flawed because the agency had failed to consider all
relevant factors and alternatives. See id. at 45, 48, 55–56.
123. Id. at 52. Under State Farm, an agency’s decision would be deemed arbitrary and
capricious if the agency (1) based its decision on factors that “Congress has not intended it to
consider,” (2) failed to address “an important aspect of the problem,” (3) provided an
explanation that “runs counter to the evidence before the agency,” or (4) provided an
explanation that was “so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or
the product of agency expertise.” Id. at 43. The agency explanation must have a “rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Id. (quoting Burlington Truck
Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
124. See Blevins, supra note 121121, at 885.
125. 136 S. Ct. 2117 (2016). In this case, employees at an auto dealership sued the
dealership alleging that it violated the Fair Labor Standards Act by not paying overtime
compensation. See id. at 2121. At issue was the U.S. Department of Labor’s interpretation of
the term “salesman” and whether the plaintiff auto service advisors were included. See id. at
2122.
126. See id. at 2125.
127. Id. at 2126.
128. See Sanders, supra note 71, at 158.
129. Landmon et al., supra note 110, at 358.
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administrative decisions.130 On the other hand, judicial review is necessary
as a last-resort check on virtually unrestrained agency discretion.131 If a
plaintiff were to challenge FDA decisions to approve a drug or require certain
labeling, courts would likely require that the FDA only “articulate a
satisfactory explanation for its action including a ‘rational connection
between the facts found and the choice made.’”132 Overall, courts are
reluctant to intervene in agency decision-making unless there is robust
evidence that the agency decision was made with improper motives.133 This
is potentially problematic because it sets the stage for FDA agents to justify
their decisions as entirely scientific, earning great deference from courts,
even where their decisions may also be influenced by other invalid
reasons.134
D. The Decision to Approve Aduhelm
The FDA has granted accelerated approval to hundreds of drugs, but few
drugs have generated as much controversy as Aduhelm has in the time since
its accelerated approval.135 To understand why Aduhelm does not fit the
accelerated approval criteria as seamlessly as the FDA purports, this section
first explains Alzheimer’s disease before diving into the saga culminating in
Aduhelm’s controversial approval.
1. Alzheimer’s Disease and the Pressure for New Treatments
Alzheimer’s disease is a progressive neurodegenerative disorder
characterized by the degeneration of brain cells, cognitive and behavioral
impairment, social and occupational dysfunction, and death.136 As the
disease progresses, patients experience a decline in thinking and
independence in personal daily activities, becoming increasingly reliant on
130. See id. at 363; see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549,
561 (2009) (“Chevron directs courts to accept the legislative assignment of interpretive
authority and defer to reasonable agency interpretations. . . . Agencies possess more expertise
than courts for handling regulatory schemes that are ‘technical and complex’ and for
reconciling the ‘competing interests’ that regulatory decisions often involve.” (quoting
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984))).
131. See Patrick Garry, The Values and Viewpoints Affecting Judicial Review of Agency
Actions: A Focus on the Hard-Look Doctrine, 53 WASHBURN L.J. 71, 81–82 (2013).
132. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156,
168 (1962)); see also Sanders, supra note 71, at 158–59 (noting that although courts are
generally deferential to agency discretion, they may still engage in closer review of FDA
decision-making where the decision appears to be the product of political forces rather than
scientific or technical judgment).
133. See Sanders, supra note 71, at 160.
134. See id.
135. See Alice Park, Biogen’s Controversial Alzheimer’s Drug Was Connected to a Patient
Death, Just as the Company Presented Its Final Study Data, TIME (Nov. 12, 2021, 11:21
AM), https://time.com/6116870/aduhelm-alzheimers-drug-death-new-data/ [https://perma.cc/
64C4-B5JY].
136. See Francesco Panza et al., A Critical Appraisal of Amyloid-β-Targeting Therapies for
Alzheimer Disease, 15 NATURE REVS. NEUROLOGY 73, 73 (2019).
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their caregivers137 for daily tasks.138 In the United States, an estimated
6.2 million people over the age of sixty-five live with Alzheimer’s disease—
by 2050, that number is projected to rise to 12.7 million.139 The Alzheimer’s
Association estimates that in 2021, the United States spent $355 billion on
Alzheimer’s costs, including $239 billion in Medicare and Medicaid
payments.140 There is no cure for Alzheimer’s, although there are drugs for
the treatment of some symptoms.141 The average life expectancy of patients
with Alzheimer’s is four to eight years; over these years, caregivers can suffer
significant negative physical, financial, and emotional stress from the strain
of caregiving.142 The devastation and prevalence of the disease have led to
a rush of investment in potential treatments, with federal government
spending on Alzheimer’s research reaching $3.1 billion in 2021, compared
to $450 million in 2005.143 Research institutions and pharmaceutical
companies have also poured substantial resources into slowing down or
stopping the progression of Alzheimer’s.144
137. Caregiving includes assistance with activities of daily living, emotional support,
coordinating care with health-care providers, and managing the patient’s health conditions.
See ALZHEIMER’S ASS’N, 2021 ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE FACTS AND FIGURES 36 (2021). 83
percent of the help provided to older adults in the United States comes from unpaid caregivers
(family members and friends); nearly half of those caregivers provide help for Alzheimer’s
and dementia patients. See id.
138. See Zeinab Breijyeh & Rafik Karamen, Comprehensive Review on Alzheimer’s
Disease: Causes and Treatment, MOLECULES, Dec. 2020, at 1, 4. In the presymptomatic stage,
one may experience mild memory loss but no functional impairment in daily activities. See id.
Early stage symptoms of Alzheimer’s include loss of concentration and memory,
disorientation of place and time, mood changes, and depression. See id. In the moderate stage,
patients may experience increased memory loss, loss of impulse control, and difficulty reading
and speaking. See id. Finally, in late stage Alzheimer’s disease, patients may not be able to
recognize family, become bedridden with difficulties in swallowing and urination, and
eventually die. See id.
139. See Facts and Figures, ALZHEIMER’S ASS’N, https://www.alz.org/alzheimersdementia/facts-figures [https://perma.cc/UHT4-5YSC] (last visited Mar. 4, 2022).
140. See id. Costs include insurance payments, nursing home care, and adult day services.
See id.
141. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., COMBINED FDA AND APPLICANT PCNS DRUGS
ADVISORY COMMITTEE BRIEFING DOCUMENT 12 (2020), https://fda.report/media/
143503/PCNS-20201106-CombinedFDABiogenBackgrounder_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T639-LDF3]. Currently approved Alzheimer’s disease treatments include
cholinesterase inhibitors and the N-methyl-D-aspartate antagonist memantine. See id. These
drugs have different mechanisms but all are approved for the treatment of dementia due to
Alzheimer’s disease. See Kristina Nikl et al., Alzheimer’s Disease: Current Treatments and
Potential New Agents, U.S. PHARMACIST (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.uspharmacist.com/
article/alzheimers-disease-current-treatments-and-potential-new-agents
[https://perma.cc/S37M-WX4K]. However, none of these treatments halt, slow, or cure the
underlying pathology of Alzheimer’s. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra, at 12. The
treatments’ effects are reversible and lessen over time due to the continued progression of the
disease process. See id.
142. See INST. FOR CLINICAL & ECON. REV., REPORT AT A GLANCE: ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE
2 (2021).
143. See Toobin, supra note 96.
144. See Michael Greicius & G. Caleb Alexander, Opinion, People Want an Alzheimer’s
Drug. This Isn’t the One., N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/28/
opinion/alzheimer-treatment-FDA-aducanumab.html
[https://perma.cc/AXQ5-ZJAA]
(describing the immense pressure on the FDA from pharmaceutical companies and PAOs to
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One theory has dominated the field of Alzheimer’s research for more than
twenty-five years: the “amyloid hypothesis,” which posits that the
accumulation of the peptide amyloid-β in the brain triggers
neurodegenerative processes and causes Alzheimer’s disease.145 Since the
amyloid hypothesis was first proposed, scientific journals and professional
societies have promoted and rewarded research targeting amyloid-β plaques
to the point where one National Institutes of Health (NIH) researcher called
the hypothesis “an almost religious belief system, where people stopped
being skeptical or even questioning.”146 Today, the amyloid hypothesis
remains controversial, with critics pointing out that amyloid-β plaques are
found in the brains of many elderly people with and without Alzheimer’s.147
Importantly, data supporting a connection between the amount of amyloid-β
plaque present in the brain and cognitive function are weak and inconsistent
at best.148 Moreover, many drugs targeting amyloid-β plaques have failed to
slow cognitive decline in clinical trials.149 One study pooled together data
from fourteen clinical trials of drugs targeting amyloid-β plaque (including
the Aduhelm trials) and found that reduction in amyloid levels was unlikely
to have meaningful cognitive benefits within the time frame of typical
trials.150 Although this does not conclusively invalidate the amyloid
hypothesis, it does suggest that the “use of anti-amyloid drugs is not a viable

approve of a new treatment for Alzheimer’s disease, with proponents arguing that any
treatment would be “better than nothing”).
145. See Simon Makin, The Amyloid Hypothesis on Trial, 559 NATURE S4, S5 (2018) (“The
aggregation of amyloid-β is thought to trigger a cascade of disease-causing processes such as
inflammation, . . . synapse dysfunction and cell death, which ultimately leads to dementia.”).
146. Sharon Begley, The Maddening Saga of How an Alzheimer’s ‘Cabal’ Thwarted
Progress
Toward
a
Cure
for
Decades,
STAT
(June
25,
2019),
https://www.statnews.com/2019/06/25/alzheimers-cabal-thwarted-progress-toward-cure/
[https://perma.cc/7TD6-MYG4]; see also Daniel R. George & Peter J. Whitehouse,
Alzheimer’s, Inc.: When a Hypothesis Becomes Too Big to Fail, SCI. AM. (Aug. 25, 2021),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/alzheimers-inc-when-a-hypothesis-becomes-toobig-to-fail/ [https://perma.cc/5BE2-FE32] (describing the “field’s inability to modify or
abandon the amyloid hypothesis in light of contravening evidence”).
147. See Makin, supra note 145, at S5.
148. See Hedva Barenholtz Levy, Accelerated Approval of Aducanumab: Where Do We
Stand Now?, ANNALS PHARMACOTHERAPY, 2021, at 1, 3 (“The impact of reducing [amyloidβ plaque] accumulation and at what stage of development is unknown. Statistical significance
found in clinical trials is based on small changes on clinical rating scales that may not translate
to clinically significant improvement.”); Makin, supra note 145, at S5 (listing examples of
clinical trials for therapies targeting amyloid-β which had to be halted due to lack of efficacy
or severe side effects).
149. See Pam Belluck, Many Alzheimer’s Experts Say Use of Aduhelm Should Be Sharply
Limited, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/21/health/aduhelmalzheimers-drug.html [https://perma.cc/C9JG-34NJ]; Panza et al., supra note 136, at 77
(explaining that in all clinical trials of drugs that decrease production of plaque or increase
plaque brain clearance, treatments failed to improve cognitive outcomes despite reducing
plaque; some drugs even worsened clinical status compared with placebo).
150. See Sarah F. Ackley et al., Effect of Reductions in Amyloid Levels on Cognitive
Change in Randomized Trials: Instrumental Variable Meta-Analysis, BRIT. MED. J., Feb.
2021, at 1, 7. Data were pooled together because it is possible that the benefit of amyloid
reduction might be too small to detect within any individual trial. See id. at 2.
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strategy for the prevention or treatment of Alzheimer’s disease and that other
potential targets may merit more attention.”151
2. Aduhelm: A Drug Approved Based on Inconclusive Data
Despite the lack of evidence demonstrating a causal connection between
amyloid-β plaques and Alzheimer’s disease, Biogen pushed forward with its
drug, aducanumab (commercially known as Aduhelm).152 Like many failed
Alzheimer’s therapeutic agents before it, Aduhelm is an immunotherapy that
induces clearance of amyloid-β plaques from the brain.153 Alzheimer’s
patients require monthly intravenous infusions, whereby Aduhelm is
injected, sticking to the amyloid-β molecules and essentially tricking the
body’s immune system into thinking that the plaques are foreign invaders,
leading the body to remove them.154
To move forward in the drug development process, Biogen had to collect
evidence supporting Aduhelm’s safety and efficacy.155 To that end, Biogen
conducted two trials for Aduhelm, called ENGAGE (Study 301)156 and
EMERGE (Study 302),157 that were practically identical in their design and
had an eighteen-month duration among patients with a mean age of seventy
years who had mild cognitive impairment or early symptomatic Alzheimer’s
disease.158
Both trials were global, randomized, double-blind,
placebo-controlled studies designed to assess the efficacy, safety,
pharmacokinetics, and pharmacodynamics of Aduhelm.159 In total, over
3200 participants were randomly assigned to Aduhelm (high-dose or
low-dose) or a placebo.160
The primary clinical outcome measured was the change in mean score on
the Clinical Dementia Rating Scale–Sum of Boxes (CDR-SB).161 The
CDR-SB assesses cognition and function through an interview with the
patient, where the patient receives a score in six categories: memory,
orientation, problem-solving, community affairs, hobbies, and personal

151. Id. at 6.
152. See George & Whitehouse, supra note 146.
153. See Rudolph E. Tanzi, FDA Approval of Aduhelm Paves a New Path for Alzheimer’s
Disease, 12 ACS CHEM. NEUROSCIENCE 2714, 2714 (2021).
154. See Andrew E. Budson, A New Alzheimer’s Drug Has Been Approved. But Should
You Take It?, HARV. HEALTH PUBL’G (July 15, 2021), https://www.health.harvard.edu/blog/anew-alzheimers-drug-has-been-approved-but-should-you-take-it-202106082483
[https://perma.cc/ML38-5VT6].
155. See supra Part I.A for an explanation of the drug development process.
156. See ENGAGE Trial, supra note 8.
157. See EMERGE Trial, supra note 8.
158. See Lewis H. Kuller & Oscar L. Lopez, ENGAGE and EMERGE: Truth and
Consequences?, 17 ALZHEIMER’S & DEMENTIA 692, 692 (2021).
159. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 141, at 28.
160. See ENGAGE Trial, supra note 8; EMERGE Trial, supra note 8.
161. See GRACE A. LIN ET AL., INST. FOR CLINICAL AND ECON. REV., ADUCANUMAB FOR
ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE:
EFFECTIVENESS AND VALUE 9 (2021), https://icer.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/10/ICER_ALZ_Final_Report_080521.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9DSEENNW].
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care.162 A total possible score ranges from zero to eighteen, with higher
scores indicating greater disease severity.163 Notably, the minimal clinically
important difference is estimated to be one to two points.164
In ENGAGE, neither treatment group (i.e., those receiving high-dose and
low-dose Aduhelm) had statistically significant165 differences on either
primary or secondary efficacy endpoints from those receiving a placebo—
essentially, the data failed to show that either the low or high dose of
Aduhelm significantly reduced the CDR-SB score in test subjects.166
Although the EMERGE trial did show a statistically significant change where
high-dose participants scored 0.39 points lower on CDR-SB than placebo
participants, it is important to note that this change was less than the
one-to-two point change that is considered clinically significant among the
scientific community.167
Both trials were halted in March 2019 based on an interim analysis that
was conducted by an independent data monitoring committee168 and that
concluded, based on data collected through October 2018, that Aduhelm was
unlikely to benefit Alzheimer’s patients compared to placebo.169 At the time,
the decision was an enormous disappointment to Biogen and the scientific
community because Aduhelm “was supposed to be the drug that finally
proved [the amyloid hypothesis] after multiple other failures.”170 The
decision was a devastating blow to Biogen as shares fell 29 percent and
erased almost $16 billion in market value.171
However, in October 2019, reanalysis of data from EMERGE combined
with additional late evidence confirmed that participants in the high-dose
Aduhelm group declined less in cognition and function over eighteen months
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id. In the scientific literature, a clinically significant outcome, not to be confused
with a statistically significant outcome, is defined as the smallest difference in score that
patients perceive as beneficial and that would mandate a change in the patient’s management.
See J. Scott Andrews et al., Disease Severity and Minimal Clinically Important Differences in
Clinical Outcome Assessments for Alzheimer’s Disease Clinical Trials, 5 ALZHEIMER’S &
DEMENTIA: TRANSLATIONAL RSCH. & CLINICAL INTERVENTIONS 354, 354 (2019).
Interestingly, the FDA “accepts a statistically significant change on an inherently meaningful
instrument such as CDR-SB as evidence of a clinically meaningful effect.” U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., supra note 141, at 34.
165. Statistical significance refers to whether any differences observed between groups
being studied are reliable or whether they are simply due to random chance. See Statistical
Significance, INST. FOR WORK & HEALTH (Apr. 2005), https://www.iwh.on.ca/whatresearchers-mean-by/statistical-significance [https://perma.cc/3HZE-T978].
166. See Lin et al., supra note 161, at 10.
167. See id. at 9.
168. A clinical trial data monitoring committee is a group of individuals with pertinent
expertise that regularly reviews accumulating data from ongoing trials to advise the sponsor
on the safety of trial subjects and the continuing scientific merit of the trial. See U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., supra note 7, at 1.
169. See Adam Feuerstein, Biogen Halts Studies of Closely Watched Alzheimer’s Drug, A
Blow to Hopes for New Treatment, STAT (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/
03/21/biogen-eisai-alzheimer-trial-stopped/ [https://perma.cc/U5S4-6A29].
170. See id.
171. See id.
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compared to the placebo group.172 According to Biogen, the larger dataset
from the EMERGE trial showed that, ultimately, EMERGE was a “positive
study, providing the primary contribution to the substantial evidence of the
effectiveness of [Aduhelm.]”173 Biogen announced that it planned on
submitting Aduhelm for FDA approval, with Biogen’s then Chief Medical
Officer, Al Sandrock, stating that the “futility analysis was incorrect . . .
because it was from a smaller dataset that looked at patients with less
exposure to high dose [Aduhelm].”174
In light of all the clinical trial data, on November 6, 2020, the FDA
convened the Peripheral and Central Nervous System Drugs Advisory
Committee, which consisted of eleven voting members,175 various
non-voting FDA participants, and open public hearing speakers.176 In the
briefing document given to the advisory committee, the FDA stated that the
results of the EMERGE trial were “highly persuasive and . . . a strongly
positive study on multiple distinct and important clinical measures.”177
However, the advisory committee was concerned that the EMERGE trial
“could not be viewed without consideration of [the ENGAGE trial] since
[ENGAGE] was designed to be identical to [EMERGE] but was negative.”178
Several committee members cited the FDA’s own statistical reviewer, who
concluded that because “[t]here is only one positive study at best and a
second study which directly conflicts with the positive study. . . . substantial
evidence has not been met in this application.”179
In both trials at the high and low dose, Aduhelm effectively removed
amyloid-β plaques,180 but the advisory committee expressed uncertainty as
to whether plaque reduction actually conferred cognitive improvement.181
Also concerning was the fact that more than 40 percent of participants in
172. See Matthew Herper, In Shocking Reversal, Biogen to Submit Experimental
Alzheimer’s Drug For Approval, STAT (Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/
10/22/biogen-to-submit-aducanumab/ [https://perma.cc/LGH3-6HUS]. The post hoc nature
of these analyses resulted in a loss of randomization, which limits the conclusions that can be
drawn from them. See Lin et al., supra note 161, at 20.
173. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 141, at 56.
174. Herper, supra note 172.
175. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., TRANSCRIPT FOR THE NOVEMBER 6, 2020, MEETING
OF THE PERIPHERAL AND CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM DRUGS ADVISORY COMMITTEE 2–7
(2020), https://www.fda.gov/media/145691/download [https://perma.cc/SH7K-QAJW].
176. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FINAL SUMMARY MINUTES OF THE PERIPHERAL AND
CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM DRUGS ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETING 2 (2020),
https://www.fda.gov/media/145690/download [https://perma.cc/96KV-BPBW].
177. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 141, at 57.
178. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 176, at 4.
179. TRISTAN MASSIE, CTR. FOR DRUG EVAL. AND RSCH., STATISTICAL REVIEW AND
EVALUATION 10 (2020), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2021/
761178Orig1s000StatR_Redacted.pdf [https://perma.cc/P59Q-FM5W]; see also Kelly
Servick, Biogen’s Alzheimer’s Drug Candidate Takes a Beating from FDA Advisers,
SCI. (Nov. 6, 2020), https://www.science.org/content/article/biogen-s-alzheimer-s-drugcandidate-takes-beating-fda-advisers [https://perma.cc/NER4-A8JJ] (describing more issues
that the advisory committee had with the EMERGE and ENGAGE results).
180. See Lin et al., supra note 161, at ES1.
181. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 176, at 5.
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EMERGE and ENGAGE receiving the FDA-approved dose developed
amyloid-related imaging abnormalities (ARIAs), compared to 10 percent in
the placebo groups.182 Ultimately, ten members of the advisory committee
voted against approval, concluding that there was insufficient evidence to
show that Aduhelm could slow cognitive decline, while the eleventh member
voted “uncertain.”183 After the advisory committee’s damning vote against
approval, it appeared that Aduhelm’s journey had come to an end and that
FDA approval was unlikely.184
3. The FDA’s Approval Decision Causes Controversy
While the FDA’s decision on approval was delayed because of COVID-19,
many thought that if Aduhelm was approved, it would be “an
eyebrow-raising departure, and would likely be met with confusion and
criticism.”185 After the advisory committee’s overwhelming vote against
traditional approval, the FDA shockingly granted accelerated approval on
June 7, 2021.186 Here, accelerated approval was based on a different
endpoint than the focus of the November 2020 advisory committee meeting:
instead of the CDR-SB cognitive scale that was used in the ENGAGE and
EMERGE trials, the FDA based approval on MRI findings of amyloid-β
plaque.187 This was a surprise because at the November 2020 meeting, the
FDA had told the advisory committee that the agency was “not using the
amyloid as a surrogate for efficacy.”188 In fact, the FDA’s decision directly
contradicted its earlier 2018 guidance document, wherein the agency stated
that for early stage Alzheimer’s disease trials, there was “no sufficiently
reliable evidence that any observed treatment effect on such biomarker

182. See Moghavem et al., supra note 5, at 331. ARIAs manifest via symptoms including
headache, confusion, nausea, and gait disturbances. See id.
183. Andrew Joseph, Member of FDA’s Expert Panel Resigns over Controversial
Alzheimer’s Therapy Approval, STAT (June 8, 2021), https://www.statnews.com/2021/06/08/
fda-expert-panel-resigns-alzheimers-approval/ [https://perma.cc/PXA8-72LP].
184. See Jacob Bell et al., 5 Takeaways From the FDA’s High-Stakes Meeting for Biogen’s
Alzheimer’s Drug, BIOPHARMA DIVE (Nov. 9, 2020), https://www.biopharmadive.com/news/
fda-alzheimers-biogen-aducanumab-takeaways/588653/ [https://perma.cc/TQ26-RHLZ].
185. See id. (quoting several commentators who were skeptical about Aduhelm’s prospects
after the November 2020 advisory committee meeting).
186. See Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., supra note 3.
187. See Patricia Cavazzoni, FDA’s Decision to Approve New Treatment for Alzheimer’s
Disease, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (June 7, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/news-eventshuman-drugs/fdas-decision-approve-new-treatment-alzheimers-disease
[https://perma.cc/UD7K-EPKL] (explaining that even though the advisory committee did not
discuss accelerated approval, the FDA ultimately granted Aduhelm accelerated approval
“based on . . . reduction of amyloid plaque in the brain”); see also Reshma Ramachandran &
Joseph S. Ross, Opinion, New Alzheimer’s Drug Sets Dangerous Precedent, CNN
(June 17, 2021, 2:37 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/17/opinions/biogen-alzheimersdrug-opinion-ramachandra-ross/index.html [https://perma.cc/LP25-WDKD] (noting that the
“FDA changed the rules in the middle of the game” by switching to amyloid-β plaque as a
surrogate for efficacy).
188. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 175, at 140.
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measures would be reasonably likely to predict clinical benefit.”189 Given
the FDA’s sharp reversal of the advisory committee’s vote, several
committee members resigned, citing concerns over the lack of evidence that
the drug was effective in reducing Alzheimer’s symptoms while having
significant adverse reactions,190 and criticizing the FDA’s approval based on
considerations that were not part of the advisory committee’s discussions.191
One agency adviser who resigned from his committee post in protest called
it “probably the worst drug approval decision in recent U.S. history.”192
Of primary concern for the advisory committee was the FDA’s approval
based on a surrogate endpoint instead of the primary endpoint used in the
Aduhelm trials.193 An effective surrogate endpoint should be “reasonably
likely, based on epidemiologic, therapeutic, pathophysiologic, or other
evidence, to predict clinical benefit,”194 but FDA statistical review of the
ENGAGE and EMERGE trials found no evidence that amyloid changes
correlated with cognitive or functional changes.195 While surrogate
endpoints allow patients to try promising drugs without waiting for years of
clinical trials, critics argue against placing drugs on the market that have not
yet demonstrated the ability to produce direct, meaningful benefits to
patients.196 A study on surrogate endpoints used in oncological trials
demonstrated that the strength of association between the surrogates used and
clinically meaningful outcomes is often unknown or weak, and attempts to
validate surrogates are rarely undertaken, suggesting that the benefits of

189. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., EARLY ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE: DEVELOPING DRUGS FOR
TREATMENT, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 6 (2018), https://www.fda.gov/files/drugs/published/
Alzheimer%E2%80%99s-Disease---Developing-Drugs-for-Treatment-Guidance-forIndusty.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YZT-3BHF].
190. See Moghavem et al., supra note 5, at 331 (describing ARIAs found during clinical
trials for Aduhelm).
191. See Letter from Aaron S. Kesselheim, Professor of Med., Brigham & Women’s
Hosp./Harv. Med. Sch., to Janet Woodcock, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (June
10, 2021), https://pbs.twimg.com/media/E3jKN4GWYAUGj9U.png [https://perma.cc/
3HYT-32N6].
192. Matthew Herper et al., Newly Disclosed FDA Documents Reveal Agency’s
Unprecedented Path
to Approving
Aduhelm,
STAT
(June
22,
2021),
https://www.statnews.com/2021/06/22/documents-reveal-fda-unprecedented-aduhelmdecision/ [https://perma.cc/T2Y8-5H4Q].
193. See G. Caleb Alexander et al., Revisiting FDA Approval of Aducanumab, 385 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 769, 769 (2021) (criticizing the FDA’s late-stage decision to grant accelerated
approval for Aduhelm and noting that, before approval, “the FDA had not indicated that it
considered beta-amyloid . . . an acceptable surrogate end point for clinical trials”).
194. 21 C.F.R. § 314.510 (2022).
195. See Alexander et al., supra note 193, at 770 (noting that the FDA determined it was
“not clear that there is any linkage between reduction in plaque and long term clinical
change”).
196. See Edwards, supra note 58, at 418; see also Oriana Ciani et al., Time to Review the
Role of Surrogate End Points in Health Policy: State of the Art and the Way Forward, 20
VALUE IN HEALTH 487, 493 (2017) (“Surrogates can result in market access for technologies
that turn out to offer no true health benefit—or even harm—to patients and can result in
overestimation of treatment effects, which can lead to inappropriate decisions on coverage.”).
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many approved drugs are uncertain at best.197 Basing FDA approval on
surrogate endpoints is controversial because they may not have strong
predictive power for outcomes of interest.198
In 2009, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) investigated
FDA oversight of surrogate marker studies and concluded that the FDA was
failing to enforce verification of surrogate endpoints.199 For example, at the
time of the GAO investigation, the FDA had still not withdrawn the drug
ProAmatine after the drug spent almost thirteen years on the market
following its accelerated approval, despite the lack of required
post-marketing studies.200 Yet, this criticism from the GAO has ostensibly
failed to reform FDA procedures.201 In fact, the FDA rejected the GAO’s
recommendation to clarify the conditions under which the FDA would
expedite withdrawal of drugs approved under the accelerated approval
process if sponsors either failed to complete post-marketing studies or
demonstrate clinical effectiveness of the drug.202 According to Dr.
Gonsalves, the “entire system completely disincentivizes the need to show
clinical benefit . . . .
It’s driving drug development in the wrong
direction.”203
In basing accelerated approval on the amyloid-β plaque surrogate
endpoint, the FDA overruled the advisory committee and skirted the issue of
the conflicting CDR-SB clinical endpoint results in the Aduhelm trials.
Granted, the FDA is not required by law or regulation to follow its advisory
committees’ recommendations.204 However, previous overrulings have
generally occurred when advisory committee votes were closer between the
197. See Robert Kemp & Vinay Prasad, Surrogate Endpoints in Oncology: When Are They
Acceptable for Regulatory and Clinical Decisions, and Are They Currently Overused?, BMC
MED., July 2017, 1, 2; Bishal Gyawali et al., Assessment of the Clinical Benefit of Cancer
Drugs Receiving Accelerated Approval, 179 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 906, 906 (2019) (finding
that out of ninety-three cancer treatments granted accelerated approval from 1992 to 2017,
only nineteen showed improvement in overall patient survival).
198. See Austin B. Frakt, The Risks and Benefits of Expedited Drug Reviews, 320 JAMA
225, 226 (2018).
199. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-866, NEW DRUG APPROVAL: FDA
NEEDS TO ENHANCE ITS OVERSIGHT OF DRUGS APPROVED ON THE BASIS OF SURROGATE
ENDPOINTS 29 (2009), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-09-866.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BZF4LMH] (finding that the “FDA has not fully utilized its available enforcement tools, even
when sponsors have failed to complete required studies”).
200. See id. at 33–34; Silberner, supra note 43.
201. See ANNA KALTENBOECK ET AL., INST. FOR CLINICAL AND ECON. REV.,
STRENGTHENING THE ACCELERATED APPROVAL PATHWAY: AN ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL
POLICY REFORMS AND THEIR IMPACT ON UNCERTAINTY, ACCESS, INNOVATION, AND COSTS,
19 (2021), https://icer.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Strengthening-the-AcceleratedApproval-Pathway-_-ICER-White-Paper-_-April-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/NY95-QHNJ]
(noting that the FDA did not change any internal procedures in response to GAO concerns
about the FDA underenforcing accountability for disclosing the results of post-marketing
studies).
202. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 199, at 63–64.
203. Silberner, supra note 43.
204. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 64, at 1 (“Although the [advisory]
committees provide recommendations to the Agency, final decisions are made by FDA.”); see
also supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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experts who approved and those who did not.205 The FDA approval of
Aduhelm signifies a sharp departure from this pattern. Notably, Aduhelm’s
approval breaks with FDA precedent because accelerated approval is
traditionally used for drugs that have not yet proven themselves in large
clinical trials.206 However, Aduhelm went through two Phase III trials that
yielded conflicting evidence.207 Nonetheless, the FDA justified its decision
by citing the FDCA, which gives the FDA the authority to use accelerated
approval on any treatment “upon a determination that the product has an
effect on a surrogate endpoint that is reasonably likely to predict clinical
benefit.”208 The agency concluded that reducing amyloid plaque is a
surrogate endpoint reasonably likely to predict clinical benefit in
Alzheimer’s disease.209
Since its approval, some major American health systems have announced
that they do not plan on administering Aduhelm, citing the current data
regarding the drug’s safety and efficacy.210 Other doctors have noted that
Aduhelm’s potential side effects (brain swelling and hemorrhages) must be
monitored carefully and that doctors should disclose to patients that there are
many unknowns about the drug, including whether it can provide any
benefit.211 Dr. Paul Aisen, director of the Alzheimer’s Therapeutic Research
Institute at the University of Southern California, noted that “[i]t is
impossible to determine on an individual patient level whether someone is
benefiting or not.”212
In response to public criticism of the FDA’s decision to approve Aduhelm,
Patrizia Cavazzoni, director of the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research, stated that the FDA granted accelerated approval because “the
Agency concluded that the benefits of Aduhelm for patients with
Alzheimer’s disease outweighed the risks of the therapy.”213 She insisted
that the FDA had not deviated from the usual course of action when
reviewing NDAs.214 Importantly, she failed to mention one issue that made
Aduhelm quite unusual in the context of FDA regulatory decisions: there

205. See Zhang et al., supra note 71, at 813 (finding an increasing likelihood of discordance
between advisory committee recommendations and FDA action associated with a decreasing
degree of consensus among advisory committee members); see also Joseph, supra note 183.
206. See Herper et al., supra note 192.
207. See id.
208. 21 U.S.C. § 356.
209. See Billy Dunn et al., An Appropriate Use of Accelerated Approval—Aducanumab for
Alzheimer’s Disease, 385 NEW ENG. J. MED. 856, 856 (2021) (arguing that “there is
compelling evidence that [Aduhelm] reduces plaque; and this reduction by a monoclonal
antibody targeting aggregated amyloid is reasonably likely to predict clinical benefit—benefit
supported by two controlled trials”).
210. See Pam Belluck, Cleveland Clinic and Mount Sinai Won’t Administer Aduhelm to
Patients, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/14/health/clevelandclinic-aduhelm.html [https://perma.cc/7GAJ-FYE6].
211. See Belluck, supra note 149.
212. Id.
213. Cavazzoni, supra note 187; see also Specter, supra note 4.
214. See Cavazzoni, supra note 187.
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appeared to be an alarming intimacy between Biogen and the FDA in the
lead-up to Aduhelm’s accelerated approval decision.
STAT, a media company that specializes in journalism focusing on the
pharmaceutical industry, was the first to break the news of Project Onyx, an
off-the-books campaign to resurrect Aduhelm after the EMERGE and
ENGAGE clinical trials were halted for futility in March 2019.215 STAT
reported that after a meeting between Biogen and the FDA on June 14, 2019,
a memo was sent to Biogen in which the FDA suggested the possibility of
accelerated approval for Aduhelm.216 The fact that accelerated approval was
discussed as early as June 2019 is significant because it was never brought to
the attention of the advisory committee when it met in November 2020.217
An anonymous Biogen employee told STAT, “I knew from the interest levels
within FDA that the agency was always going to find a way to approve
Aduhelm.”218 A former FDA official who watched the advisory committee
meeting called the FDA officials’ actions and tone “very promotional,”
which was inappropriate because the FDA “should not be trying to lead the
panel to an outcome . . . . [The] FDA should be as unbiased as they can
be.”219
As further evidence of the controversial nature of the FDA’s approval of
Aduhelm, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of
Inspector General has begun to investigate Aduhelm’s approval and examine
generally the accelerated approval pathway, but it is not yet clear what it will
conclude.220 In a separate inquiry on September 1, 2021, lawmakers from
the House Committee on Oversight and Reform and the House Committee
on Energy and Commerce requested data from the FDA on its Aduhelm
approval decision, emphasizing the government’s concern about “apparent
anomalies in FDA’s processes surrounding its review of Aduhelm.”221
Specifically, the House Committee’s request to the FDA included (1) the
body of evidence that the agency relied on to determine that amyloid-β

215. See Adam Feuerstein et al., Inside ‘Project Onyx’: How Biogen Used an FDA Back
Channel to Win Approval of Its Polarizing Alzheimer’s Drug, STAT (June 29, 2021),
https://www.statnews.com/2021/06/29/biogen-fda-alzheimers-drug-approval-aduhelmproject-onyx/ [https://perma.cc/8F6C-2NBR].
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See Review of the FDA’s Accelerated Approval Pathway, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., https://oig.hhs.gov/reports-and-publications/
workplan/summary/wp-summary-0000608.asp [https://perma.cc/8NLC-C337] (last visited
Mar. 4, 2022). Any reports from this investigation are expected to be issued in 2023. See id.
221. Letter from Frank Pallone, Jr., Chairman, Comm. on Energy and Com. & Carolyn B.
Maloney, Chairwoman, Comm. on Oversight and Reform, to Janet Woodcock, Acting
Comm’r, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Sept. 1, 2021), https://energycommerce.house.gov/
sites/democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/files/documents/EC%20COR%20FDA%20Adu
helm%20Letter%209.1.21.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZKF3-9TF8]; see also Rachel Cohrs,
Congress Demands Documents from FDA on Controversial Approval of Biogen’s Alzheimer’s
Drug, STAT (Sept. 2, 2021), https://www.statnews.com/2021/09/02/congress-demandsdocuments-fda-biogens-alzheimers-drug/ [https://perma.cc/ZGU5-2EJ2].
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plaque was an appropriate endpoint, (2) the clinical trial data that convinced
the FDA that Aduhelm should receive accelerated approval, (3) historical
information about approvals in contravention of the advisory committee’s
recommendation, and (4) internal reviews of coordination between the FDA
and Biogen.222
II. THE EFFECT OF THE FDA’S DECISION TO APPROVE ADUHELM
The FDA’s decision to grant accelerated approval to Aduhelm shocked the
pharmaceutical and health-care industries and will have consequences for
pharmaceutical companies, medical researchers, and patients with and
without Alzheimer’s. This part describes the weaknesses of the accelerated
approval pathway as seen through the story of Aduhelm. Part II.A questions
what the appropriate role of the FDA should be, considering how closely the
FDA worked with Biogen and PAOs leading up to Aduhelm’s approval. Part
II.B then describes how Aduhelm has already begun to influence the course
of medical research both in and beyond Alzheimer’s disease. Finally, Part
II.C explains the economic impact of Aduhelm’s approval. As discussed
later, these connections raise numerous questions about the appropriate role
of sponsors and PAOs in the accelerated approval process.
A. The Appropriate Role of the FDA as a Regulatory Agency
The accelerated approval of Aduhelm is a prime example of what can
result when the FDA is pressured to usher in new treatments by industry and
patients alike. Although it is important for the FDA to work with sponsors
and listen to patient perspectives to ensure that new drugs move through the
approval process efficiently, this section examines the deleterious effect that
accelerated approval has on the FDA’s role as a regulatory agency.
1. Responding to Industry Pressure
Although early engagement between the FDA and sponsors is officially
encouraged,223 Project Onyx provides an example of regulatory capture and
how the FDA can abuse its discretion in carrying out the will of a sponsor to
get a drug onto market.224 The FDA arguably has a strong reason to help the
very companies that it regulates, sometimes going as far as to blatantly
consider the financial prospects of sponsors when making drug approval
decisions.225 The FDA, at least indirectly, considers pharmaceutical
222. See Cohrs, supra note 221.
223. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 189, at 5–6 (encouraging sponsors to
discuss their plans with the FDA early in development when conducting research on
Alzheimer’s disease).
224. See supra Part I.D.3 for a discussion on Project Onyx, Biogen’s off-the-books
campaign to persuade the FDA to approve Aduhelm.
225. See, e.g., Memorandum from Luciana Borio, Acting Chief Scientist, U.S. Food &
Drug Admin., to Robert Califf, Comm’r of Food & Drugs, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. 16
(Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2016/206488_
summary%20review_redacted.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Z3D-HG8E] (noting that the FDA’s Dr.
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companies’ financial health because it is closely tied to the FDA’s own
revenue stream.226 Pharmaceutical companies pay user fees to support their
regulators, a practice stemming from the idea that if companies benefit from
the FDA’s decisions, the companies should cover the FDA’s costs.227
Although user fees provide the FDA with much-needed funding and enable
the agency to significantly cut down on median approval time for NDAs, user
fees may present a glaring conflict of interest in which the FDA faces
pressure to approve the drugs made by the very companies that provide the
FDA’s revenue stream.228 Some critics argue that only regulatory capture
can explain why increased speed alone would cause the FDA to too quickly
approve, and not simply review, new drugs.229
2. Working with Patient Advocacy Organizations
Besides industry perspectives, the FDA also seeks input from patients who
suffer from the disease in question.230 PAOs231 are formally organized
nonprofit groups that serve people affected by a specific medical condition
and raise awareness about the disease, treatment options, and new research
on the disease.232 PAOs are vital to the drug development process because
they are a strong voice for more government resources and faster FDA drug
approval, particularly on behalf of patients with devastating diseases for
which there are few or no treatment options.233 They also help
Janet Woodcock “cautioned that, if Sarepta did not receive accelerated approval for eteplirsen,
it would have insufficient funding to continue to study eteplirsen and the other similar drugs
in its pipeline”).
226. See Toobin, supra note 96.
227. See James L. Zelenay, Jr., The Prescription Drug User Fee Act: Is a Faster Food and
Drug Administration Always a Better Food and Drug Administration?, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
261, 262 (2005) (explaining that user fees were developed so that the FDA could obtain more
revenue, hire more employees to decrease NDA review times, and speed up the public’s access
to new drugs); see also FDA AT A GLANCE, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (2021),
https://www.fda.gov/media/154548/download [https://perma.cc/H9EN-YKFJ] (noting that in
2020, 46 percent of the FDA’s budget, or $2.8 billion, was paid for by industry user fees).
228. See Michael Gabay, The Prescription Drug User Fee Act: Cause for Concern?, 53
HOSP. PHARMACY 88, 88 (2018).
229. See Zelenay, supra note 227, at 310 (arguing that user fees inappropriately place the
FDA in industry’s pocket); see also Patrick O’Leary, Funding the FDA: Assessing the User
Fee Provisions of the FDA Safety and Innovation Act of 2012, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 239, 257
(2013) (arguing that even if there is no actual regulatory capture, the appearance of capture is
itself problematic because the FDA’s ability to protect the public depends on its credibility).
230. See FDA Patient Engagement Overview, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Sept. 14, 2020),
https://www.fda.gov/patients/learn-about-fda-patient-engagement/fda-patient-engagementoverview [https://perma.cc/YE6T-D5DX] (describing the various FDA initiatives that connect
patients with FDA decision-making).
231. PAOs are also called advocacy groups, disease advocacy groups, health advocacy
groups, and health consumer groups, which are all meant to highlight their focus on the patient
perspective and distinguish them from professional organizations. See Susannah L. Rose,
Patient Advocacy Organizations:
Institutional Conflicts of Interest, Trust, and
Trustworthiness, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 680, 685 n.1 (2013).
232. See id. at 680.
233. See, e.g., Anne-Laure Winkler & David Finegold, Giving Patients a Say: How to
Work with Patient Advocacy Groups, NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY, Jan. 2008, at 1, 1 (noting that
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pharmaceutical companies and regulators identify patients and develop the
best primary and secondary endpoints for clinical trials.234 In certain
research areas, including those covering Alzheimer’s disease and
Parkinson’s disease, PAOs, rather than pharmaceutical companies, fund an
increasing share of scientific research.235
On the other hand, PAOs are sometimes so effective at voicing their
perspectives to the FDA that both parties may lose sight of upholding
scientific rigor and protecting public health. After the advisory committee
voted against approving Aduhelm in its November 2020 meeting, the
Alzheimer’s Association scheduled a listening session with Cavazzoni, the
then acting director of the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research,
on January 20, 2021.236 The listening session included testimonials from
patients and caregivers about their experiences with Alzheimer’s disease and
discussion on how much risk they would be willing to accept when trying a
new treatment.237 Peter Stein, director of the FDA’s Office of New Drugs,
said that the FDA “heard very clearly from patients that they’re willing to
accept some uncertainty to have access to a drug that could provide
meaningful benefit in preventing the progression of [Alzheimer’s]
disease.”238 In the wake of Aduhelm’s approval, PAOs for other diseases
have already begun to push for approval of new treatments and more relaxed
standards.239
Critics argue that, “under steady pressure from the
pharmaceutical industry and the patient groups it funds, the F.D.A. has

a PAO for muscular dystrophy, which consisted of 3000 parents of sick children, helped pass
the MD-Care Act in 2001 that mandated that the NIH promote research for muscular
dystrophy); T. Joseph Mattingly II & Linda Simoni-Wastila, Patient-Centered Drug
Approval: The Role of Patient Advocacy in the Drug Approval Process, 23 J. OF MANAGED
CARE & SPECIALTY PHARMACY 1078, 1078 (2017) (describing the controversial approval of
eteplirsen in 2016, when then FDA Commissioner Dr. Robert Califf received nearly 3000
emails from patient advocates alone urging for the approval of a drug that the advisory
committee had mostly voted against).
234. See Raymond A. Huml et al., Accelerating Rare Disease Drug Development: Lessons
Learned from Muscular Dystrophy Patient Advocacy Groups, 55 THERAPEUTIC INNOVATION
& REGUL. SCI. 370, 374–75 (2020).
235. See Sinha & Latham, supra note 88; see also Margaret Goldberg, Patient Advocacy
Groups and Innovators Must Partner to Advance New Treatments, STAT (July 6, 2021),
https://www.statnews.com/2021/07/06/patient-advocacy-groups-and-innovators-mustpartner-to-advance-new-treatments [https://perma.cc/Z4U4-GF3R] (noting that the Michael J.
Fox Foundation, a PAO for Parkinson’s disease, has partnered with pharmaceutical companies
to fund research which led to FDA approval of at least two treatments in 2020 alone).
236. See Derrick Gingery, Patient Support May Have Helped Push Aduhelm Toward
Approval, PINK SHEET (June 7, 2021), https://pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/
PS144438/Patient-Support-May-Have-Helped-Push-Aduhelm-Toward-Approval
[https://perma.cc/GFD9-FGL6].
237. See id.
238. Id.
239. See Sinha & Latham, supra note 88 (regarding the FDA’s decision to approve
Aduhelm, Neil Thakur, chief mission officer of the ALS Association, said “we need [FDA] to
do the same for people with ALS [amyotrophic lateral sclerosis] immediately”).
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progressively lowered its standards of effectiveness and safety required for
drug approvals.”240
B. Steering the Course of Medical Research
The accelerated approval of Aduhelm has opened the door for drugs with
similar mechanisms of action to follow. This is not necessarily a problem; it
is possible that after Aduhelm’s approval, subsequent amyloid-targeting
treatments will improve upon Aduhelm and provide even greater benefits for
patients.241 One drug development consultant has noted that the tide is
already turning in terms of renewed interest in neurodegenerative disease
research investment.242 Indeed, lecanemab, an investigational anti-amyloid
agent similar to Aduhelm, was granted breakthrough therapy designation by
the FDA in June 2021.243
However, the opposing view is the concern that Aduhelm’s accelerated
approval will lead to less innovative drug development.244 Aduhelm’s
approval may have a ripple effect on the pharmaceutical industry, potentially
lowering the bar for FDA approval of other drugs.245 Scientists argue that
the “approval [of Aduhelm] could lower standards for future drugs, allowing
240. Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, Opinion, The F.D.A. Has Reached a New Low,
N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/15/opinion/alzheimers-drugaducanumab-fda.html [https://perma.cc/N5U4-KDDC].
241. For example, azidothymidine (AZT) was the first treatment for HIV/AIDS and faced
serious doubts about its safety and efficacy, but FDA approval led to continued investment
and research in that drug class, paving the way for the development of new, safer, and more
effective generations of antiretroviral drugs. See Antiretroviral Drug Discovery and
Development, NAT’L INST. OF ALLERGY & INFECTIOUS DISEASES, https://www.niaid.nih.gov/
diseases-conditions/antiretroviral-drug-development [https://perma.cc/Q5UL-FNQL] (Nov.
26, 2018).
242. See Asher Mullard, Alzheimer’s Drug Approval Could Affect Other Diseases, 595
NATURE 162, 162 (2021).
243. See Press Release, Biogen, EISAI and Biogen Inc. Announce U.S. FDA Grants
Breakthrough Therapy Designation for LECANEMAB (BAN2401), an Anti-Amyloid Beta
Protofibril Antibody for the Treatment of Alzheimer’s Disease (June 23, 2021),
https://investors.biogen.com/news-releases/news-release-details/eisai-and-biogen-incannounce-us-fda-grants-breakthrough-therapy [https://perma.cc/SH2P-BCJA].
Other
anti-amyloid antibodies being researched include Roche’s gantenerumab and Lilly’s
donanemab. See Adam Feuerstein, In Reversal, Eli Lilly Now Intends to Seek Fast Approval
for Alzheimer’s Treatment, STAT (June 24, 2021), https://www.statnews.com/2021/06/24/elililly-seek-fast-approval-for-alzheimers-treatment/
[https://perma.cc/7ENK-3B6Z]
(announcing that Eli Lilly and Company’s plans on seeking accelerated approval for its drug,
donanemab, based on the “unprecedented regulatory path established by Biogen”).
244. See Dylan Scott, The New Alzheimer’s Drug Is the First of Its Kind. Will It Be the
Last?, VOX (June 24, 2021, 12:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/22547044/
new-alzheimers-disease-drug-aducanumab-research-science
[https://perma.cc/UX5MQ2ZY].
245. See id.; Robert Langreth, All Wall Street Cares About Today Is Lilly’s Alzheimer’s
Drug, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 3, 2021, 12:15 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2021-08-03/all-wall-street-cares-about-today-is-lilly-s-alzheimer-s-drug?sref=kGAyuRSx
[https://perma.cc/9EG8-X3UX] (quoting Eli Lilly and Company’s chief scientific officer as
saying that “Aduhelm’s approval . . . pav[es] the way for Lilly to apply for approval of its drug
sooner than expected” and that “Lilly hopes donanemab can also gain accelerated approval on
the basis of its ability to remove amyloid”).
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them onto the market before experts in the field are convinced the benefits
outweigh any safety risks.”246 The FDA’s approval of Aduhelm provides
tacit support for the controversial amyloid hypothesis and “opens the door
for other plaque-clearing anti-amyloid antibodies . . . to pursue similar
accelerated approval without having to first demonstrate clinical efficacy.”247
After Aduhelm’s approval, pharmaceutical companies are incentivized to
invest in something that has already been FDA-approved, potentially
overlooking other more fruitful theories.248
Moreover, it may become more difficult to conduct research to test new
Alzheimer’s drugs now that Aduhelm is available.249 Scholars predict that
patients and their families will choose to be treated with the approved
Aduhelm instead of joining an observational study or participating in a
clinical trial of an unapproved treatment.250 Thus, the approval and
availability of Aduhelm could make Alzheimer’s patients less willing to
enroll in trials for other promising therapies.251 On top of a lack of patient
willingness to participate in studies, pharmaceutical companies have little
incentive to even try to recruit subjects for post-marketing studies—after all,
a patient in a clinical trial does not pay for the drug, but a patient getting a
prescription through a doctor does. Indeed, Biogen does not appear
motivated to recruit subjects for its required post-marketing study: it recently
launched a direct-to-consumer marketing campaign pushing readers to ask
their doctors whether they may have undiagnosed mild cognitive
impairment.252 The campaign, a paid post in the New York Times, directed

246. See Belluck & Robbins, supra note 6; see also Lin et al., supra note 161, at 53 (noting
that “sponsors of [amyloid-clearing] drugs may assume that it is not necessary to have
outcomes data beyond amyloid clearance before applying for regulatory approval”).
247. Erik S. Musiek et al., Aducanumab for Alzheimer Disease: The Amyloid Hypothesis
Moves from Bench to Bedside, J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION, Oct. 15, 2021, 1, 2.
248. See id. (noting that the availability of Aduhelm might jeopardize future clinical trials
of potentially more effective Alzheimer’s treatments).
249. See Sarah S.P. DiMagno et al., Accelerated Approval of Cancer Drugs—Righting the
Ship of the US Food and Drug Administration, 179 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 922, 923 (2019)
(“Approval of ineffective drugs also crowds out innovation that might produce effective
treatment. Once a drug has been approved for a certain indication, other companies and
researchers might not invest resources in treatments related to the condition, believing that
there is no market.”).
250. See M.W. Weiner et al., How Will Aducanumab Impact AD Research?, 8 J.
PREVENTION ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE 391, 392 (2021).
251. See Fiona Rutherford, Alzheimer’s Drug Discord Puts FDA Accelerated System
Under Fire, BLOOMBERG (June 30, 2021, 7:30 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2021-06-30/alzheimer-s-drug-discord-puts-fda-accelerated-system-under-fire
[https://perma.cc/3J7A-EN9Y].
252. See Biogen, When Memory Fades, N.Y. TIMES (2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
paidpost/biogen-memory/its-time-we-know/when-memory-fades.html
[https://perma.cc/
6QGZ-C2M9] (paid post sponsored by Biogen and Eisai); Madhav Thambisetty, ‘When
Memory Fades’: Misinformation About Alzheimer’s Disease and Aduhelm Must Be Limited,
STAT (July 21, 2021), https://www.statnews.com/2021/07/21/when-memory-fadesmisinformation-about-alzheimers-disease-and-aduhelm-must-be-limited/ [https://perma.cc/
F5BC-QQV9].
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readers to Alzheimer’s specialists and made no mention of recruitment into
clinical trials.253
Much of the uncertainty over Aduhelm’s efficacy stems from the fact that
the FDA granted accelerated instead of traditional approval. Because
Aduhelm’s accelerated approval was based on a surrogate endpoint (the
drug’s ability to reduce amyloid-β plaque),254 Biogen was temporarily
allowed to defer submitting robust evidence of clinical benefits—it has until
February 2030 to finish a Phase IV post-marketing trial on Aduhelm’s
efficacy.255 However, David Whitrap, vice president for communications at
the Institute for Clinical and Economic Review (ICER), has stated that “[i]f
approval would’ve been withheld and the company was just asked to run a
third trial to provide further insight into whether the drug works, that trial
surely could’ve been accomplished far sooner than 2030.”256 Once
accelerated approval was granted and Biogen was allowed to sell Aduhelm,
there became considerably less incentive for Biogen to do the research that
would tell other pharmaceutical companies and medical researchers whether
it is worthwhile to continue pursuing amyloid-targeting treatments.
C. Economic Impact: Aduhelm’s Ripple Effect on American Taxpayers
Biogen originally set the price of Aduhelm at $56,000 per patient per
year257 before decreasing the price to $28,200 after a disappointing
commercial launch.258 The true annual cost for Aduhelm will likely be
higher because the standard price was calculated based on dosing for a patient
weighing about 163 pounds, which is below average for American adults.259
ICER, an independent nonprofit research institute that studies drugs and
medical services, estimates that the drug’s yearly price will actually be
253. See Thambisetty, supra note 252 (describing the “slick paid post” as a
“direct-to-consumer marketing campaign that seeks to greatly expand the target population of
people that are candidates for Aduhelm”).
254. See Cavazzoni, supra note 187.
255. See Letter from Billy Dunn, Dir., Off. of Neuroscience, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation &
Rsch., to Priya Singhal, Vice President, Global Safety and Regul. Scis., Biogen (June 7, 2021),
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/appletter/2021/761178Orig1s000ltr.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y5B4-CGDE]; see also Rutherford, supra note 251. Biogen has announced
that it expects to begin the Phase IV post-marketing trial for Aduhelm in May 2022. See
Damian Garde & Adam Feuerstein, As Aduhelm Faces Doubts, Biogen Plans Another Pivotal
Trial for 2022, STAT (Dec. 16, 2021), https://www.statnews.com/2021/12/16/as-aduhelmfaces-doubts-biogen-plans-another-pivotal-trial-for-2022/ [https://perma.cc/A3S4-9HY3].
256. Rutherford, supra note 251.
257. See Josh Katz et al., New Drug Could Cost the Government as Much as It Spends on
NASA, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/22/upshot/alzheimersaduhelm-medicare-cost.html [https://perma.cc/RS7J-AYER].
258. See Adam Feuerstein, Biogen Slashes Price of Alzheimer’s Drug Aduhelm in Half,
Plans $500M in Cost-Cutting, STAT (Dec. 20, 2021), https://www.statnews.com/2021/
12/20/biogen-slashes-price-of-alzheimers-drug-aduhelm-in-half-plans-500m-in-cost-cutting/
[https://perma.cc/82TU-GMND].
259. See Alex Ruoff & Jasmine Ye Han, Drugmakers to Pay Billions for Wasted Drugs
Under
Senate
Deal,
BLOOMBERG
L.
(Aug.
5,
2021,
5:15
AM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-law-news/drugmakers-to-pay-billions-forwasted-drugs-under-senate-deal [https://perma.cc/N24G-8JQS].
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between $3000 and $8400.260 In an analysis of long-term cost effectiveness
of Aduhelm, ICER also determined that “despite the tremendous unmet need
for new treatments for Alzheimer’s disease . . . the current evidence [is]
insufficient to demonstrate that aducanumab slows cognitive decline, while
it is clear that it can harm some patients.”261
Aduhelm’s approval has already begun to impact the country economically
through its close connection to Medicare patients. Although there are many
drugs on the market with similar or greater price tags, Aduhelm is unique in
that it has an excessive cost and it is a drug with potentially millions of
customers who are expected to take the drug for the rest of their lives.262
About 80 percent of the patients eligible for Aduhelm are old enough to
receive coverage under Medicare.263 Because Aduhelm is an infusion drug
that must be administered in doctors’ offices and clinics, rather than taken at
home, it is covered under Medicare Part B.264 Medicare does not set its own
rates for drugs covered under Part B and instead reimburses providers 103
percent of the wholesale acquisition cost until an average sales price (ASP)
is determined, at which point Medicare reimburses providers 106 percent of
the ASP.265 Patients without a supplemental insurance plan would have to
pay the 20 percent Part B coinsurance266: $5640 for the $28,200 drug.
Patients with supplemental plans may see their premiums rise in response to
the increased costs of Aduhelm.267 As one doctor put it, “[A]ll of us, one

260. See Press Release, Inst. for Clinical & Econ. Rev., ICER Publishes Final Evidence
Report and Policy Recommendations on Aducanumab for Alzheimer’s Disease (Aug. 5,
2021), https://icer.org/news-insights/press-releases/icer-publishes-final-evidence-report-andpolicy-recommendations-on-aducanumab-for-alzheimers-disease/ [https://perma.cc/DL2RY9E9]. ICER’s price range represents the highest U.S. price Biogen should charge for
Aduhelm, based on the amount of improvement in overall health seen in clinical trials, when
a higher price would cause disproportionately greater losses in health among other patients in
the health system due to rising overall costs of health care and health insurance—essentially,
it is the “top price range at which a health system can reward innovation and better health for
patients without doing more harm than good.” Id.
261. Id.; see also supra note 182 (discussing ARIAs).
262. See Katz et al., supra note 257.
263. See Pam Belluck, Medicare Proposes to Sharply Limit Coverage of the Alzheimer’s
Drug Aduhelm, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/11/health/
aduhelm-medicare-alzheimers.html [https://perma.cc/2C3E-D9VL].
264. See Nicholas Bagley & Rachel Sachs, The Drug That Could Break American Health
Care, ATLANTIC (June 11, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/06/
aduhelm-drug-alzheimers-cost-medicare/619169/ [https://perma.cc/LP5N-F4SH] (explaining
that Medicare Part B generally covers FDA-approved physician-administered medications
that are reasonable and necessary for the patient).
265. See Cubanski & Neuman, supra note 11. Medicare is currently prohibited from
negotiating prescription drug prices, but President Joe Biden has proposed in his Build Back
Better Framework making drugs eligible for negotiation once they have been on the market
for nine to twelve years. See Press Release, White House, President Biden Announces
Prescription Drug Pricing Plan in Build Back Better Framework (Nov. 2, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/11/02/president-bidenannounces-prescription-drug-pricing-plan-in-build-back-better-framework/
[https://perma.cc/C65C-MSRQ].
266. See Moghavem et al., supra note 5, at 332.
267. See id.

2338

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

way or another, are going to feel this expense.”268 In fact, CMS announced
in November 2021 that Medicare Part B monthly premiums would increase
by $21.60 in 2022, the largest increase in the program’s history,269
specifically citing the approval of Aduhelm as one rationale.270
In response to the looming costs of Aduhelm treatment, doctors have
called for CMS to restrict coverage to only certain Medicare beneficiaries
(such as those meeting inclusion criteria for the Aduhelm clinical trials) or
for CMS to not cover Aduhelm at all, citing scientific evidence on the lack
of efficacy and risk of harm.271 Technically, Medicare may refuse to pay for
medical care that is “not reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or
treatment of illness or injury.”272 However, historically, it has only denied
about 3 percent of claims submitted by hospitals and physicians.273 In
January 2022, CMS shocked the scientific community by doing exactly what
doctors had been calling for: CMS proposed that Medicare would cover
Aduhelm, but only for patients enrolled in certain CMS-approved clinical
trials.274 This marked the first time that CMS limited Medicare beneficiaries’
access to an FDA-approved drug in this way.275 The proposal did not contain
details on whether patients would be required to pay to participate in the trials
or whether patients would know if they were in a placebo or treatment
group.276 If the decision is finalized in the spring of 2022, it would
effectively limit the use of Aduhelm to an estimated few thousand patients
enrolled in randomized trials over the next three to five years, as the majority

268. Lawrence H. Price, Aducanumab:
Boon or Bust?, BROWN UNIV.
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY UPDATE, Nov. 2021, at 7, 7.
269. See Dena Bunis, Medicare Part B Premium Increase for 2022 Largest Ever, AM.
ASS’N RETIRED PERSONS (Nov. 15, 2021), https://www.aarp.org/health/medicareinsurance/info-2021/part-b-premiums-increase.html [https://perma.cc/9YQV-FG73].
270. See Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 12. In January
2022, Department of Health and Human Services Secretary Xavier Becerra directed CMS to
reconsider its decision to raise premiums after Biogen decreased Aduhelm’s price to $28,200.
See Rachel Cohrs, Becerra Orders Medicare to Reconsider Premium Hike Following Price
Drop for Biogen’s Aduhelm, STAT (Jan. 10, 2022), https://www.statnews.com/2022/01/
10/becerra-medicare-aduhelm-reconsider-price/ [https://perma.cc/CY3N-NYXK].
271. See Moghavem et al., supra note 5, at 332 (noting that “[a]lthough it would be highly
unusual for CMS to decline to cover a drug approved by the FDA, the accelerated approval of
aducanumab was itself highly unusual”).
272. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(B).
273. See Joshua D. Gottlieb et al., The Complexity of Billing and Paying for Physician
Care, 37 HEALTH AFFS. 619, 624 (2018) (analysis of Medicaid and Medicare data showing
that, in 2015, the denial rate in Medicare Advantage was 3 percent).
274. Monoclonal Antibodies Directed Against Amyloid for the Treatment of Alzheimer’s
Disease, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Jan. 11, 2022), https://www.cms.gov/
medicare-coverage-database/view/ncacal-decision-memo.aspx?proposed=Y&NCAId=305
[https://perma.cc/9K9F-G8B3]. The proposal is not final and may change before it is finalized
in the spring of 2022. See id.
275. See Belluck, supra note 263.
276. See Rachel Cohrs, No One Has Any Idea How Much Money Seniors Could Pay for
New Alzheimer’s Drug, STAT (Jan. 14, 2022), https://www.statnews.com/2022/01/14/noone-has-any-idea-how-much-money-seniors-could-pay-for-new-alzheimers-drug/
[https://perma.cc/5X9V-XELG].
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of patients who meet FDA approval criteria would not be covered by
Medicare.277
The astronomical costs are not limited to just Aduhelm itself. In an op-ed,
two experts at the Yale School of Medicine warned that “the approval of
[Aduhelm] has unleashed a perilous precedent that could usher in the
approval of countless, costly treatments of uncertain benefit and even
harm.”278 Aduhelm’s approval increases the likelihood that other drugs
targeting amyloid-β plaques will be approved, potentially compounding the
financial strain that Aduhelm already presents.279
III. STRATEGIES TO SLOW DOWN ACCELERATED APPROVAL
The saga of Aduhelm highlights how accelerated approval allows drugs
with unproven clinical benefit to linger in the market, steering the course of
medical research and calling into question whether the FDA is yielding too
easily to industry pressure. This part contains three proposals to prevent the
FDA from using accelerated approval to authorize another drug like
Aduhelm. Part III.A suggests revisions to the operations of FDA advisory
committees. Part III.B discusses ways to incentivize pharmaceutical
companies to complete Phase IV post-marketing trials. Part III.C theorizes
how plaintiffs may challenge a questionable FDA approval decision in court.
The proposed regulatory reforms are ripe for implementation, as the FDA’s
drug, generic drug, biosimilar, and device user fee programs expire in
September 2022, at which time Congress must pass new legislation for the
FDA to continue collecting fees and doing its work.280 Some scholars have
emphasized that because reauthorization legislation is essential for the FDA
to continue operating, it is a “natural vehicle for other FDA legislative
reforms.”281
A. Suggested Revisions to the Role of Advisory Committees
The approval process for Aduhelm eroded public confidence in the
FDA.282 Although the advisory committee, an independent group of experts,
strongly voted against approval, the FDA still approved the drug without
277. See Belluck, supra note 263.
278. Ramachandran & Ross, supra note 187.
279. For examples of other anti-amyloid antibodies with mechanisms similar to Aduhelm,
see supra note 243.
280. See PDUFA VII:
Fiscal Years 2023–2027, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
(Aug. 23, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/industry/prescription-drug-user-fee-amendments/
pdufa-vii-fiscal-years-2023-2027 [https://perma.cc/L3PY-NTNQ].
281. Keith Flanagan, Congress Should Fix FDA’s Accelerated Approval Program for the
Next 30 Years, STAT (Aug. 12, 2021), https://www.statnews.com/2021/08/12/congress-fixaccelerated-approval-program-for-next-30-years/ [https://perma.cc/5J8J-QPAW].
282. See Steve Usdin, FDA’s Aducanumab Decision Will Erode Public Trust: An Editor’s
Commentary, BIOCENTURY (June 7, 2021, 7:51 PM), https://www.biocentury.com/article/
637011 [https://perma.cc/L8HS-S26C]; DHIRAJ KUMAR ET AL., TOPICAL INSIGHTS INTO THE
POST-APPROVAL CONTROVERSIES OF ADUCANUMAB 2 (2021) (noting that “any future
congressional hearings on NIH funding, the FDA’s decision, and Medicare reimbursement for
Aduhelm would all show a negative influence on faith in the agency”).
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disclosing any data showing a patient-level correlation between amyloid
clearance and cognitive outcomes from clinical trials.283 As Dr. Aaron
Kesselheim, one of the advisory committee members who resigned after
Aduhelm’s approval, wrote in his resignation letter, the FDA “needs to
reassess its decision-making processes, including . . . how Committee
recommendations are used (or ignored) by FDA officials. When clear
[advisory committee] recommendations against a drug are overruled by FDA
administrators . . . the agency owes it to the nation to provide a detailed
justification.”284
The FDA should issue new guidance requiring the agency to follow the
advisory committee’s recommendations or to submit detailed justification for
deviating from such recommendations. Currently, FDA guidance regarding
advisory committees simply states that the “rationale for decisions and
reasons for no decisions should be documented.”285 If the FDA wants to
disregard the advisory committee’s concerns—particularly when the vote is
so skewed toward disapproval—it should support its position by providing a
scientific explanation to refute the evidence that the advisory committee
relied on. For consistency, ICER has proposed that the FDA create a
template that would include a structured explanation for why accelerated
approval was deemed more appropriate than regular review.286 Developing
a formal and public template would lead to more disciplined reporting and
increased transparency among stakeholders.287 This would represent the
FDA “tak[ing] concrete steps to become clearer about the way it engages its
advisory committees and to be transparent and consistent in . . . the timing of
its decisions to use the accelerated approval pathway.”288
Formally requiring the FDA to follow the advisory committee’s
recommendations or to provide detailed justification for overriding the
advisory committee would take away some of the flexibility that the FDA
currently has in its decision-making. However, it would also help fulfill the
FDA’s mission of maintaining public trust for the benefit of all patients. A
lack of trust can lead the public to refuse certain medicines or vaccines and
encourage people to turn to alternative non-FDA-approved products because
they believe there are more trustworthy health experts out there.289
283. See Lin et al., supra note 161, at 52.
284. Kesselheim, supra note 191.
285. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 64, at 5.
286. See KALTENBOECK ET AL., supra note 201, at 25.
287. See id. at 19.
288. Lin et al., supra note 161, at 52.
289. See, e.g., Dan Diamond, ‘I’m Still Not Planning to Get It’: Approval Not Swaying
Some
Vaccine
Holdouts,
WASH. POST
(Aug.
25,
2021,
3:59
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2021/08/25/fda-approval-vaccine-holdouts/
[https://perma.cc/C8RD-XWXN]; Selena Simmons-Duffin, Poll Finds Public Health Has a
Trust Problem, NPR (May 13, 2021, 12:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2021/05/13/
996331692/poll-finds-public-health-has-a-trust-problem
[https://perma.cc/MC79-ZZER]
(describing a poll which found that only 52 percent of Americans trust the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) and that only 37 percent of Americans trust the NIH or the
FDA).
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Additionally, requiring the FDA to publish its reasoning for overriding the
advisory committee’s recommendation would provide future litigants with
the necessary information to challenge FDA decisions in court.290
B. Incentivizing Pharmaceutical Companies to Complete Phase IV
Post-Marketing Trials
It is unlikely that Biogen will ever complete the required Phase IV
post-marketing trials to show Aduhelm’s clinical benefit.291 The Food and
Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997292 authorizes the FDA to
use expedited procedures to withdraw accelerated approval of drugs and
biological products if sponsors fail to conduct required post-approval Phase
IV studies with due diligence or the investigations fail to verify clinical
benefits.293 Currently, sponsors with ongoing post-marketing studies for
accelerated approvals already provide periodic reports to the FDA that
include information about the progress of the study and whether the
anticipated milestones have been met.294 The FDA also has the power to
issue administrative action letters, assess financial penalties, and withdraw
approval should expected evidence not materialize in post-marketing Phase
IV trials.295
The FDA should exercise its existing powers more aggressively. This is
easier said than done: the FDA may hesitate to remove a drug from the
market because the FDA would thereby hurt the revenue streams of the
companies that pay the user fees that make up the FDA’s own budget.
Additionally, if the FDA were to take a drug off the market for a disease with
few available treatments, such as Alzheimer’s, it might draw intense backlash
from patients and the broader public. Even with its existing powers in place,
the FDA needs additional ways to further incentivize pharmaceutical
companies to actually conduct and complete post-marketing studies. For
example, the FDA could wait to grant accelerated approval until there is
proof that confirmatory trials are either initiated or in progress.296 This
would require the FDA to devote more resources to monitoring the progress
of post-marketing trials more closely. The cost of increasing monitoring
efforts would be worthwhile because, without approval, companies cannot
begin to profit—the ultimate incentive to comply with the FDA.
290. See infra Part III.C.
291. See supra Part II.B.
292. Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
293. See 21 U.S.C. § 356(b)(3); Steenburg, supra note 85, at 331.
294. Required information includes, in relevant part: (1) the date of the post-marketing
study requirement; (2) a description of the post-marketing study requirement; (3) the schedule
for completing and reporting of the post-marketing study requirement; (4) the current status
of the post-marketing study requirement—as pending, ongoing, delayed, terminated, or
submitted; and (5) an explanation of the status. 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.81(b)(2)(vii)(a), 601.70(b)
(2022).
295. See Anne Kaltenboeck et al., Potential Policy Reforms to Strengthen the Accelerated
Approval Pathway, 10 J. COMPAR. EFFECTIVENESS RSCH. 1177, 1180 (2021).
296. See id.
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Some scholars have suggested requiring Biogen to provide Aduhelm at the
pure cost of producing the drug plus a maximum profit of 5 percent—a
reasonable reimbursement given the uncertainty around Aduhelm’s safety
and effectiveness.297 Such minimal profits would incentivize Biogen to
complete Phase IV post-marketing trials quickly because the company would
be entitled to their desired $28,200 price only if post-marketing trials
provided enough evidence of the drug’s clinical benefits.298 As some experts
have written, the “paradigm must be shifted from ‘any drug at any cost’ to
‘the best drug at the right cost.’”299 For this proposal to work, pharmaceutical
companies would have to report their costs of researching and producing the
drug to the government to determine how much they could be reimbursed
through Medicare and Medicaid. This would be another way to use financial
incentives to ensure that pharmaceutical companies actually do the work to
show a clinical benefit in their drugs even after being granted accelerated
approval. The danger would be that pharmaceutical companies might be
discouraged from pouring millions of dollars into research and development
if it is unclear whether they could immediately profit just as much, if not
more, after being granted accelerated approval. However, there are
mathematical methods to incorporate the value of innovation into drug
prices—pharmaceutical companies may be rewarded for being the first in a
new drug class instead of adding to a drug class that already addresses a
satisfied need.300
Finally, new legislation could impose a moratorium on direct-to-consumer
pharmaceutical advertising301 until Phase IV post-marketing trials are
complete. Restricting companies from conducting direct-to-consumer
advertising would strongly incentivize them to complete Phase IV
post-marketing trials in a timely manner, effectively requiring companies to
first find participants for trials before being allowed to find customers for the
same drug. Alternatively, the FDA could issue new regulations requiring
that if an accelerated approval drug is to be advertised, there must be a
warning that states the drug in question has only been preliminarily approved
and that a study showing clinical benefit has not been completed yet.
C. Challenging FDA Decisions in Court
Scholars have argued that existing judicial review frameworks allow
agencies to make decisions that lack evidentiary support, reliability, and

297. See Leonard M. Fleck, Alzheimer’s and Aducanumab: Unjust Profits and False
Hopes, 51 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 9, 11 (2021).
298. See id.
299. Sinha & Latham, supra note 88.
300. See, e.g., Santiago G. Moreno & Joshua A. Ray, The Value of Innovation Under
Value-Based Pricing, 4 J. MKT. ACCESS & HEALTH POL’Y 1, 2 (2016) (proposing a
modification to conventional cost-effectiveness analysis to include the value of innovation in
new drug development).
301. See supra Part II.B for a discussion of Biogen’s direct-to-consumer pharmaceutical
advertising.
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accountability, and that are prone to conflicts of interest.302 Some propose
that, to combat regulatory reactivity, courts should “employ a diminished
level of Chevron deference when agencies act in ways that go against expert
advice or scientific understanding of the issue at hand but are nonetheless
justified by reasoning that evades characterization of the decision as
‘arbitrary or capricious.’”303
When the FDA deviates from the
recommendations of scientific experts, such as in the case of Aduhelm, “the
court would no longer be required to follow step two of the Chevron test but
would instead apply a non-deferential standard of review.”304 Professor
Heled believes that, under the traditional Chevron framework, the bar is low
for the FDA to justify its approval of Aduhelm before a court.305 The FDA
itself has given a number of facially plausible reasons for its decision to
approve Aduhelm: “Alzheimer’s is a serious disease with substantial unmet
need; . . . there is compelling evidence that [aducanumab] reduces plaque[]
and this reduction . . . is reasonably likely to predict clinical benefit.”306
Such justification would likely be enough for a court but would not
adequately reflect the FDA’s disregard for scientific expertise.307 Members
of the FDA advisory committee, Medicare and Medicaid, and organizations
concerned about drug pricing (e.g., Alzheimer’s patient advocacy groups and
Public Citizen) may have standing to sue the FDA and challenge its decision
to approve a drug like Aduhelm in court.308
Because an FDA approval decision has never been challenged in court in
this way, it is difficult to theorize whether such litigation would be successful
for plaintiffs seeking to challenge the accelerated approval of Aduhelm.
There would be clear difficulties in challenging Aduhelm’s approval in court:
First, courts have been generally unwilling to question the FDA’s judgment
regarding standards for assessing safety and efficacy.309 Additionally, there
might be public backlash from patients who are willing to accept the risk of
Aduhelm’s questionable safety and efficacy in exchange for the hope of one
more weapon against Alzheimer’s disease.310
302. See supra Part I.C.2; Yaniv Heled et al., Opinion, Regulatory Reactivity in FDA’s
Approval of Aduhelm, REGUL. REV. (July 6, 2021), https://www.theregreview.org/2021/07/
06/heled-rutschman-vertinsky-regulatory-reactivity-fda-approval-aduhelm/
[https://perma.cc/W343-7ZZK].
303. Heled et al., supra note 302. Under the Chevron doctrine, courts would give judicial
deference to agency interpretation of its statutory powers where Congress has not spoken
directly on the issue. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 468 U.S. 837, 842
(1984).
304. See Heled et al., supra note 302.
305. See Interview with Yaniv Heled, Professor of L., Ga. State Univ. (Nov. 2, 2021).
306. Dunn et al., supra note 209, at 856.
307. See Interview with Yaniv Heled, supra note 305.
308. See id. Issues such as the injury-in-fact requirement are beyond the scope of this Note;
this Note merely operates arguendo that plaintiffs can establish standing.
309. See Steenburg, supra note 85, at 334.
310. See, e.g., Dylan Scott, The Harrowing New Reality for Alzheimer’s Patients, VOX
(July 19, 2021, 8:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/22577776/alzheimersdisease-dementia-symptoms-aduhelm-drug
[https://perma.cc/3B2S-4V6J]
(describing
Alzheimer’s patients and family members who were enthusiastic about Aduhelm even after
reading negative news coverage about the drug’s unproven effectiveness, noting that their
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Nonetheless, instead of employing a diminished level of Chevron
deference as Professor Heled has suggested, courts should instead
incorporate State Farm hard look review into the Chevron analysis where the
agency has not engaged in “reasoned decisionmaking.”311 Under State
Farm, agencies must provide detailed and reasoned explanations of their
decisions, explain deviations from precedent, and make policy choices that
are objectively reasonable under the circumstances.312 The current attorney
general, Merrick Garland, once described hard look review in this way:
“[H]ard look demands that the agency show that the course it chose was
reasonable in light of the relevant policies, alternatives, and facts.”313
Encino Motorcars is instructive of this idea, whereby a court could
scrutinize the FDA’s decision to grant accelerated approval to Aduhelm.
There, the Supreme Court stated that when an agency changes its policy
course, it must give adequate reasoning for its decision-making.314 Here, the
FDA has arguably not given adequate reasoning for its decision to grant
accelerated approval to Aduhelm based on its ability to remove amyloid-β
plaque from patients’ brains. In particular, plaintiffs could argue that under
hard look review, the FDA’s explanation that it approved Aduhelm based on
its ability to reduce amyloid-β plaque “runs counter to the evidence before
the agency”315 that this surrogate endpoint is not reasonably likely to predict
clinical benefit.316 There was ample discussion of the advisory committee’s
skepticism over the ENGAGE and EMERGE clinical data at the November
2020 meeting, and yet the FDA defied the near-unanimous opinion of the
independent group of experts.317 Additionally, plaintiffs may argue that the
FDA’s purported reasoning for approving Aduhelm was “so implausible that
it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise.”318 After all, the agency’s reliance on Aduhelm’s ability to reduce
plaque in the brain contradicted its own guidance on the reliability of
amyloid-β plaques as a surrogate endpoint.319 Thus, the agency should not
be given Chevron deference, a finding that would return the case to the FDA
to make a different, more informed decision or to provide more detailed
“hope and the adrenaline of that hope outweighs all of their reason and they are clamoring for
the drug”).
311. See supra note 123 for the factors to be considered in State Farm hard look analysis.
312. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
34–51 (1983).
313. Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 554
(1985).
314. See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016) (citing State
Farm, 463 U.S. at 43) (explaining that the agency’s reasoning should be clear enough to show
“a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made”).
315. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.
316. For a discussion on the reasons why the FDA’s decision to grant accelerated approval
based on a surrogate endpoint contradicted scientific evidence, see supra Part I.D.3.
317. See supra Part I.D.3 for a discussion on how the approval decision lacked scientific
reasoning and generated controversy.
318. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42.
319. For a discussion on how the decision to approve Aduhelm lacked scientific reasoning
and generated controversy, see supra Part I.D.3.
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scientific reasoning for approving Aduhelm. This reasoning could be used
not just in the case of Aduhelm, but any time the FDA grants accelerated
approval based on a surrogate endpoint with a weak connection to clinical
benefit.
CONCLUSION
The success of accelerated approval is grounded in ensuring a balance
between speed and scientific accuracy. In the decades since the FDA has
begun using accelerated approval to get treatments out faster to HIV/AIDS
and cancer patients, there has been a gradual erosion in the level of scientific
rigor the FDA finds acceptable to show safety and efficacy. In the wake of
the FDA’s controversial approval, Biogen has been struggling to sell
Aduhelm, reporting just $300,000 made from Aduhelm in the first full
quarter since its approval, an amount far below the originally predicted $14
million.320 Consequently, Biogen had to plan its largest layoff ever, with
more than 1000 employees expected to lose their jobs in early 2022.321 This
is a testament to the impact of the advisory committee members who resigned
in protest and to the subsequent public backlash against the FDA’s approval
decision.
Today, it has become too easy for drugs to enter the market via the
accelerated approval pathway—Aduhelm was the drug that finally alerted the
public to the need for reform of the accelerated approval process. Going
forward, the FDA should be required to provide science-based justifications
for overriding the advisory committee’s recommendations. The FDA should
also further incentivize pharmaceutical companies to complete Phase IV
post-marketing trials. As a last resort, concerned scientists and PAOs should
consider challenging controversial FDA approval decisions in court; this
Note’s proposed changes regarding judicial approaches to agency actions can
help give these lawsuits more weight.

320. See Damian Garde & Adam Feuerstein, Biogen’s Aduhelm Sales Fall Dramatically
Below Wall Street’s Expectations, STAT (Oct. 20, 2021), https://www.statnews.com/2021/10/
20/biogens-aduhelm-sales-dramatically-below-wall-street-expectation/
[https://perma.cc/4VQG-4BEK].
321. See Adam Feuerstein & Damian Garde, Biogen’s Reckoning: How the Aduhelm
Debacle Pushed a Troubled Company and Its Fractured Leadership to the Brink, STAT
(Dec. 8, 2021), https://www.statnews.com/2021/12/08/biogen-aduhelm-al-sandrock-michelvounatsos-company-reckoning/ [https://perma.cc/TVE7-P4CF].

